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The study on Economic performance and productivity of representative Angolan purse 
seine fishing fleets contains operational and economic information regarding the small pelagic 
fishery in the fishing towns of Benguela and Namibe for the year 2014. The 28 distinct purse-
seiners represent 48% of the small pelagic fleet population and contribute with about 54% of 
landings. Most vessels vary with respect to physical and operational characteristics, how these 
variations may have affected the vessels performance and productivity is the subject matter of 
this paper. For analysis and comparison purpose, the fleet was stratified by fishing towns 
(Namibe and Benguela), and engine groups (100<HP≤400; 400<HP≤700; and HP>700). 
 To assess the economic performance, the following indicators were measured: 
EBITDA= (revenue - operating costs); EBT= (revenue - (operating costs + capital costs)); 
OCFM =(EBITDA/revenue); OM =(EBT/revenue) and ROC= (EBT/invested capital). To 
assess productivity, the following indicators were considered: CPUE; cost per unit of effort; 
revenue per unit of effort, and liters of fuel used to land 1 ton of fish. Another closely related 
indicator (environmental) was the carbon footprint, expressed in kg of CO2 emitted per liters 
of fuel burned in fishing operations. Differences in operating costs structures (labor, running 
and vessel costs) are also presented. In addition, the study presents the effects of harvest tax 
and fuel subsidies on the fleets profitability. These indicators were compared between the two 
fleets and among vessel groups.  
Results indicate that 93% of the vessels in Benguela, in contrast to 100% in Namibe 
fully recovered their operating costs, (positive EBITDA). When also considering capital costs, 
71% of vessels in Benguela, showed positive EBT and ROC. In contrast, to 70% in Namibe. 
EPI also varied among vessel groups such that 400<HP≤700 and HP>700 groups had higher 
performance in Benguela and Namibe fleets, respectively. However, these differences are not 
statistically significant (p>0.05). Vessels in Namibe operated with better cost efficiency than 
those in Benguela, particularly those in the group HP>700. Vessels in Benguela fleet operated 
with higher labour cost than those in Namibe (p=0.01), this cost was the highest in HP>700 
group. The fleet in Namibe was more efficient in terms of fuel consumption per ton of fish 
landed than that of Benguela (p<0.05). Vessel group HP>700, in Benguela was the least fuel 
and eco-efficient. Harvest tax was found to account for proportions 19 and 35% of EBT in 
Benguela and Namibe fleets, respectively. While fuel subsidies accounted for 3 and 1.4% of 
EBT in the two fleets.    
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 General information 
 
 
The Republic of Angola is located along the South West coast of Africa and is home to 
about 25 million people (INE, 2014). With a coastline of 1 650 km long and, an EEZ of 200 
NM, the country’s economy is mainly driven by marine resource base, particularly oil and gas 
(see table 2). Favourable oceanographic conditions along the SW coast of Africa make the 
Angolan coast rich in fisheries resources including small pelagic, demersal finfish, and 
crustaceans that support a large fishing industry and numerous fishery-dependent communities. 
Fishing takes place from small-scale level, operated by smaller coastal vessels; to large-scale 
level, operated by Industrial Ocean going vessels. 
With an annual landing quantity of 350 thousand tons, and value estimated at USD 950, 
million, the fishing sector contributes to the GDP with a very small proportion (around 3%). 
However, it plays a vital role on the socio-economic aspect. The small pelagic fleet comprises 
of 90 licensed purse-seiners that land about 180 thousand tons annually, with an estimated 
landing value of 216 million USD. This fleet segment employs approximately 1,500 fishermen 
as crewmembers and several people in related services. Despite their low fish grade, small 
pelagic species like sardinellas constitute a regular component of the diet of approximately one 
quarter of the population, particularly coastal people.  
The coastal provinces of Benguela and Namibe in southern Angola are the most 
important fishing towns and harbour 65% of the small pelagic purse seine fleet. The two towns 
have nearly the same fleet capacity in terms of number and size of fishing vessels. However, 
differences in the natural and social systems between the two geographical zones are factors 
that may lead to differences in productivity and economic performance of the fleets i.e. labour 
cost may be affected by the town’s social-economic structures (Flaaten, 2016). Furthermore, 
individual vessels with different dimensions may perform differently. This study can therefore 
be important towards understanding and monitoring performance of different fishing vessels. 
Further, it can contribute in understanding differences in energy and, environmental efficiency 
of the fishery, information that is indispensable for fisheries management.     




1.2 Geographical location 
 
The map below shows the geographical location of Angola, along the SE Atlantic. In 
particular, the fishing towns of Benguela and Namibe, in the south where data was collected.  
 






























Figure 1. Map of Angola showing the study area, namely Benguela and Namibe province, along the 
SE coast of the Atlantic Ocean in southern Africa. Source:  https://www.google.no/url.mapas.com. 
Edited by author.  
 
           
                       The coastal provinces of Benguela and Namibe are the most important fishing 
centres in the country due to ecological reasons explained in section 2.1. In order to perform a 
cost and earning analysis of their respective fleets, it is therefore important to look at the 
socioeconomic factors that may influence the economic performance and productivity of the 
fishing industry. For example, the population density along the coast may have influence on 
the labour market of the fishery (Flatten, 2016). 
Map of Angola showing the study area 








1.3 Research problem  
 
Many fisheries in developing countries, integrate few key economic performance-
related indicators, of different fishing fleets into management (FAO, 2005b). Whatever 
economic information exists is normally communicated piecewise and in a summarized format, 
often orally, by the operators to the public administration.  
In 2013, the Angolan Fisheries Ministry, proposed new development goals for the small 
pelagic fishery, summarized in two points: (1) to ensure sustainable fisheries, while 
maintaining the marine ecosystem functions; (2) to enhance income, create new jobs and 
improve the living standards of fishing dependent communities. Therefore, in order to evaluate 
the achievement of these goals, monitoring and reporting annual performance indicators is 
needed. This implies, the Angolan policy-makers necessitate not only reliable stock assessment 
data of small pelagic resources, but also an understanding of the economic realities of this 
fishery. At government level, fisheries managers may use this information to correct, design 
and implement policy instruments. At the industry level, operators may use this information to 
determine their real fishing effort for improving their productivity and economic efficiency.  
On his analysis, Sainsbury (1996), pointed out that, the design and operation of a fishing 
vessel may affect its productivity and economy. Then, productivity and economic efficiency 
are expected to vary between fishing zones and vessel size. Results obtained from this analysis 
can be used to determine what fleet/vessels were more efficient from a productivity point of 
view (CPUE; energy efficiency), more economically efficient (profitability and ROC) and 
more environmentally efficient (litres of fuel burnt per ton of catch). This is important and 
neutral information that can be incorporated into management advice (FAO, 2009). It may also 
contribute towards providing fleet managers with an understanding of investment decisions in 
this fishery (Sarker, 2012).  There is a perception that larger purse-seiners with higher capital 
investment are more efficient in terms of CPUE and cost per unit effort, thus, there is a need to 
test this hypothesis for the Angolan SPF.  
Increasing operating costs particularly fuel and maintenance costs, and low market 
price of the target species, particularly sardinellas, are major concerns to fishing operators, 
therefore, there is a need to understand as to what extent vessel’s average costs and revenues 
are affected by these factors.  
In one way or another, the behavior of a fish-harvesting firm is affected by the existence 
of any government’s action or inaction (Flaaten, 2016). Operators in this fishery argued that 
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they are facing financial constraints, so they need government support. The usual method of 
determining the effect of government actions i.e. harvest taxes and fuel subsidies is to analyze 
as to what extent, profit margins may be altered as a result of such measures.  
On his research, Gulbrandsen (2012) stated that fuel use intensity in fishing vessels 
varies with regard to vessel dimension, region of fishing, technologies used, skipper behaviour, 
and other factors. Responding to climate change by reducing both the amount of waste 
generated, and the amount of toxic substances released into the environment is a smart choice 
for the fishing industry (SEAFISH, 2009). The research by Tan and Culaba (n.d) supports that, 
fisheries that consume relatively less fuel not only have a lower carbon footprint, up to the 
point of landing, but are also in a favourable position to meet future fuel and emissions 
regulations. This is important information if fisheries management is to better align with 
policies to address climate change regarding GHG emissions. 
1.4 Research questions    
Based on the above considerations, the study on economic performance and 
productivity of the small pelagic fleets in Benguela and Namibe fishing towns, will attempt to 
answer the following questions:  
1)   Do the economic performance indicators differ between the fleets in the two fishing towns 
(Benguela and Namibe), and among vessel groups (engine HP)?  
2)   What fleet (in terms of fishing towns), and what vessel groups (in terms of engine HP) were 
more and/or less cost-efficient? 
3)   Do the operating cost structures differ between the fleets in the fishing towns, and among 
vessels?  
4)   What fleet (in terms of fishing towns), and what vessel groups (in terms engine HP) were 
more and/or less fuel-efficient, and eco-efficient? 
In addition to the above questions, the author will look at how government actions like, 
harvest taxes (quota tax) and fuel cost support (subsidies) may have affected annual operating 
costs and profit margins of the fleets.  
To address these problems, the author will be supported and guided by a list of study 
materials, including: operational aspects of purse seiners (i.e. Sainsbury, 1996; FAO 2009); 
Fisheries economics theories and concepts (i.e. Flaaten, 2016; Long et al, 2015); Statistical 
analysis and graphical displays (i.e. Berk and Kery, 2007; Cumming, 2007).  
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1.5 Research objectives 
 
The broad objective of this thesis is to present and compare the cost and earnings 
findings, as well as productivity of the small pelagic fleet, based on data collected through a 
representative survey of 28 purse seiners in southern Angola, for the fishing year 2014. The 
economic performance and productivity indicators shall be compared between the fleets in the 
fishing towns of Benguela and Namibe, and among vessel groups (based on engine size). Four 
main objectives will be addressed.  
The first objective is to determine a set of output economic performance indicators 
(EPI), and compare these indicators between fishing towns and among vessel groups. The 
output EPI include EBITDA (earnings before interest tax and depreciation), EBT (earnings 
before opportunity cost on owner’s capital), OM (operating margin), and ROC (return on 
invested capital).  
The second objective is to find out what fleet and vessel group are more and/or cost-
efficiency. Cost efficiency will be expressed as cost revenue ratio, computed by the relationship 
between cost per unit effort and revenue per unit effort of each vessel.  
The third objective is to compute and compare the cost structure of the fleets and vessel 
groups. The operating cost structure includes labour, running and vessel costs; while the capital 
cost includes depreciation and interest on invested capital. Quantification of the main operating 
costs will allow the author to examine their effects on the profitability of the vessels. 
The fourth objective is to compare the fuel efficiency and eco-efficiency between the 
fleets and among vessel groups. Fuel efficiency is compared in terms of litres of fuel consumed 
per ton of fish landed, while eco-efficiency in this study is based on the concept of landing 
more fish while using less quantity of fuel, hence less carbon footprint.  
The last objective is to understand how government policies on harvest quotas and fuel 
cost support might have affected the vessels operating costs and profitability. In other words, 
what proportion of operating costs and profits (EBT) are represented by harvest tax and fuel 








CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND INFORMATION – THE SMALL 
PELAGIC FISHERY  
 
2.1 The Natural System  
 
The natural system in fisheries governability refers to the marine and costal ecosystem, 
the resources it holds, and the relationships among the various components and natural driving 
forces of the ecosystem. Jentoft & Chuenpagdee (2011).  
 
                      
                                    2.1.1 The marine ecosystem                 
 
The Angolan marine realm is part of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem 
(BCLME). This is among the four most productive eastern boundary upwelling systems in the 
world. The vast ecosystem is found along the SE Atlantic Ocean, extending from the Agulhas 
Banks in South Africa, through Namibia, to southern Angola (BCC, 2014).  
The waters off the continental shelf of Angola consist of tropical warm waters, the 
Angola Current (AC), and a cold northward current, the Benguela current (BC). The two water 
masses meet at a point known as the Angola-Benguela Front (ABF). The front is considered as 
a permanent hydrographic feature, situated between 14°S – 16°S. However, episodic intrusions 
of warm, saline water southwards, as stated by (Shillington et al. 2006) can displace the front 
to approximately 23°S, with associated effects on the overall biological productivity of the 
LME. Shannon et al. (1986) termed these events Benguela Niño, as they are comparable to the 
El Niño of the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. Such variations in currents can have substantial 
impact on the growth and recruitment of fish stocks (Ekau and Verheye 2005). The sea surface 
temperatures (SST) vary with latitude and season. Usually lower in southern Angola, during 
winter, around 20 °C, and higher further north during summer, around of 28°C (Gyory et al. 
2004). The water masses within the LME contain higher nutrient concentrations because of 
coastal upwelling in addition to the ultimate water sources. Usually nitrate, phosphate and 
silicate concentrations of 10-18µM/L, 0.8-1.5µM/L and 6-15µM/L respectively (Chapman and 
Shannon, 1985). Such a high concentration of nutrients supports large biomass of 
phytoplankton like diatom and dinoflagelates species and subsequently zooplankton mostly 
those of the Calanoid species (Ekau and Verheye 2005). These form the base of the marine 
food chain, sustaining large biomass of pelagic, demersal finfish and crustaceans’ species 
particularly in the southern fishing zone, the area from Lobito in Benguela all the way to 
Cunene river mouth in Namibe province. (INIP, 2006).            
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             2.1.2 The fishing resources 
The small pelagic fishery comprises of several species (Shannon and O'Toole 1998). 
However, only a few major ones support the fishery: Two species of Trachurus: Cunene horse 
mackerel (T. trecae) and Cape horse mackerel (T. capensis); Two species of Sardinellas: The 
Madeiran or flat sardinella (S. maderensis) and the round sardinella (S. aurita); The South 
African sardine (Sardinops sagax) and small Scombrids such as jack mackerel Bianchi et. al. 
(1993). These are all bony fishes that belong to the actinopterygii (ray-finned fishes) class, and, 
coastal species that form large schools in pelagic waters.  
Information from FishBase (2016) indicayes tha T. capensis is a subtropical species 
distributed on the Eastern Atlantic (7°N - 37°S, 4°E -24°E), particularly in the Gulf of Guinea 
through Angola, to South Africa. It is usually found at depth range of 0-500 m, but highly 
concentrated in 100-300 m; has a common length of 20 - 33 cm, and can grow as long as 60.0 
cm. T. trecae on the other hand, is widely distributed, from Morocco through Angola, to 
Namibia (35°N - 19°S, 26°W - 14°E). It is usually caught between 20 - 100 m, matures at 24 
cm, grows as long as 35 cm, and feeds mainly on small crustaceans.  
The Sardinella species have a very wide distribution along the SW African coast (46°N 
- 23°S, 17°W - 36°E). Usually caught at around 50 m depth (although found up to 350 m). Its 
diet comprises mainly of small planktonic invertebrates, fish larvae and phytoplankton. Breeds 
during the warm season (July-September), and migrates in response to seasonal upwelling. The 
common length in catch is 25 cm and grow as long as 30-cm.  
Sardinops sagax, is more abundant along the Southern African coast and to a lesser 
extend off the Angolan coast, at depth range of 0 - 200 m. Feed mainly on plankton and 
zooplankton like copepods. The fish matures when 9 cm long, grows as long as 39.5 cm, and 
lives as long as 25 years FishBase (2016). Other commercial pelagic species are presented on 
the table below.  
Table 1. Main commercial pelagic species/species group in the natural system 
 
Pelagic Species/Species Groups 
Clupeids Sardinella aurita , S. maderensis 
Carangids Trachurus trecae, T. trachurus capensis  
Scombrids 
                                  Clupeidae 
Small tuna like species  
Ethmalosa fimbriata;  Sardinas oscellata; S.sagax  
Hairtails Trichiurus spp 
Barracudas Sphyraena spp 
 Engraulis hepsetus  
 





          Stock biomass  
For many years, several research cruises have been conducted off the Angolan coast 
with the aim of monitoring the status of the commercial fish stocks and the marine environment 
at large. (INP, 2014). The annual Sampling Program is conducted twice a year (during summer 
and winter), by the Angolan Fisheries Research Institute (INP), in cooperation with regional 
and international institutions such as the Benguela Current Commission and the Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). Research vessels such as Dr. Fridjof Nansen 
and RV O Pensador support the sampling program.  
Capricorn Fisheries Motoring (2012). Reported that densities and abundance of small 
pelagic schooling stocks is relatively higher in southern waters particularly along the coast of 
Namibe and to a lesser extent along the coast of Benguela province.  
Results from hydro-acoustic surveys, INIP (2014), show that during the summer season 
the biomass of the two sardinella species was estimated at 363 468 tons, of which the flat 
sardinella (Sardinella maderensis) accounted for 46%, while the round sardinella (Sardinella 
aurita) accounted for 54%. In winter, the biomass was estimated at 426 591 tons, being 72% 
flat sardinella (S. maderensis), and 28%, round sardinella (S. aurita). The highest biomass was 
reportedly recorded in 2012, when it was estimated at 1.12 million tons during winter season 
(INIP, 2014). .  
The biomass of horse mackerel (Trachurus. trecae, and Trachurus capensis) is more 
uncertain, since it highly depends on seasonal variations of water parameters. Nevertheless, its 
biomass was estimated at 66 757 tons in the summer and 136 646 tons during winter 2014 
(INIP, 2014). However, the stock rebuilding target is 430 000 tons, the estimated biomass in 
1996 (Cofrepeche, 2013).  
INIP (2013) reported that there were substantial recruitment failures in 2002-2003 and 
again in 2007, 2008. Overfishing, rather than changing climatic or oceanographic conditions, 
is considered the primary cause of biomass depletion for both species.  
The South African sardine, considered to be shared with Namibia, was also estimated 
to be depleted to critical levels; however, recent results show stock recovery (Capricorn 






2.2 The Social System  
 
In fisheries management the social system refers to all the stakeholders of the fishery 
together with their roles and interest as well as their attached cultural aspects, their social 
relation and interactions, Jentoft & Chuenpagdee (2011). The table below summarizes the 
characteristics of the social system of the study area.  
 
Table 2. Socioeconomic profiles of Benguela and Namibe provinces. 
                                                          Country’s information     
Population 25  million people (INE, 2016) 
Surface area 1 252 145 km2 
Population density 20 people/km2 
Number of provinces 18 provinces 
Official language Portuguese 
GDP 121,700 million USD (2013) 
Main exports Oil, diamonds, wood, fish and coffee 
Coastline extension 1650km (SE Atlantic) 
Annual fish landings 400 MT 
Number of industrial boats 
 
Around 240 (finfish trawlers; coastal and tuna seiners; shrimp 
trawlers) 
Number of SSF boats 5000 
Fish consumption p/c 18kg/capita 
  Benguela     Namibe    
Province surface area 39 827 km² (3%) 57 091 km² (4.5%) 




2.4 million People (10%) 
 








Coastline extension 350 km (20%) 450 km (27%) 
Geographic location 
 
Central coastline (12°S, 13°E) 
 
 




Temperate coastline (savanna)  
 








Main economic activities 
 
Trading (port), farming, fishing,  
Mining and manufacturing. 
 
Trading (port), fishing, mining 




Primary, secondary and tertiary 
institutions and training centers. 
 
Primary, secondary and tertiary 
institutions and training centers.  
 
Transport infrastructures 
Commercial port, airport, railway 
and public roads. 
Commercial port, airport, 
railway and roads. 
   
Source: own table. Data from INE (2016).  
 
10 
2.3 The Managing System  
 
 
The managing system in the fishery context refers to the legal and institutional 
framework governing the natural and the social system of the fishery (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 
2011).  
 Most small pelagic fisheries, in developing countries are managed in order to secure 
food supply and protect employment (FAO, 2009), Angola is not an exception, then, its 
managing system is grounded on a compatible institutional, legal and regulatory framework. 
The Angolan Fisheries Law (Lei n.° 6-A/04) is the legal instrument that governs the 
management and conservation policies of all aquatic living resources.  
Due to the transboundary nature of horse mackerel in the southern coast, Angola and 
Namibia, participated in the development of management plans for their horse mackerel 
fisheries in late 2013 through the ACP program funded by the European Union. However, the 
FMPs incorporated other small pelagic species that are sometimes caught together with horse 
mackerel, thus, The Small Pelagic Fisheries Management Plan. The plan emphasizes the 
sector’s role in promoting core national objectives of combatting hunger and poverty and 
maximizing socio-economic benefits within a framework of sustainable development. In 
addition, the plan considers the dynamics of the various stocks and possible harmonization and 
strengthening of management measures. The key management unit is thus the small pelagic 
stocks and the associated purse seine fleet. (Cofrepeche, 2013).  
For the past few decades, the government has been managing all marine commercial 
fisheries by a Right-based approach in the form of individual vessel quotas (IVQ), 
disaggregated from a scientifically-based TAC, regulated by a set of measures and enforced by 
a MCS system. Fishing rights are initially granted by the National Fisheries Directorate in form 
of concession rights, with a validity of up to 20 years, exclusively for national citizens (DNP, 
2013). This is the basis prior registering a fishing vessel and being allocated a harvesting quota. 
For the fishing year 2013-2014, the pelagic species TAC was set at 224, 8 thousand 
tons. One of the main objectives of the fishery is to maintain stocks at the MSY level, and to 
achieve, the best possible scientific advice is incorporated. The advice includes the use of 
indices from the commercial sectors exploiting the resource and importantly, the annual 
scientific acoustic surveys (INIP, 2013). There is a vast industrial fishermen association. They 
do not have a direct involvement in decision-making but play an advisory role, particularly in 
the Annual Advisory Council.  
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All licensed purse seiners in the fleet are eligible for the initial allocation of a share of 
the TAC. The allocation process requires comprehensive data from the fisheries operators. That 
includes information on the operational conditions of the vessel and adequate landing 
infrastructures. IVQ is preferably allocated to operators with inshore facilities (landing and 
processing/freezing). In addition, allocation criteria also focus on eligibility of ownership, 
where preference is on national citizens; good fishing records (apply to old fishers). As 
mentioned in the Fishery Law (Lei n.° 6-A/04), the installation of satellite tracking devices 
(VMS) in the entire fleet is mandatory to ensure effective surveillance.  
Table 3. TAC for the small pelagic fishery in 2014 
Species/group of species TAC (tons) 
Horse mackerel (Trachurus spp.) 55,000 
Sardinellas (S. maderensis and S. aurita) 150,000 
South African sardine (S. Sagax) 10,000 
Mackerel (Scombridae species) 8,000 
Other species  1,869 
Total  224, 869 
Source: Angolan Fisheries Directorate (2014). 
It is important to point out that the TAC quantities presented on table 3 are the overall 
quantities for the entire small pelagic fishery that incorporates 90 purse seine vessels. As a 
result of disaggregation, 33% and 45% of the TAC, as illustrated on table 4 below, were 
allocated to the Benguela and Namibe fleets, respectively in form of IVQ.  





Allocated quota (tons) 75,000 102,200 
% of TAC 33% 45% 
 





Drastic management measures have recently been implemented to favor recovery of 
the overexploited pelagic resources, particularly of horse mackerel (Trachurus spp.) to more 
sustainable levels (Cofrepeche, 2013). Table 5 summarizes the main management measures 
adopted by the managing system.  
Table 5. Management measures for the small pelagic fishery 2014. 




Input control and 
Technical restrictions  
 
•   Licensed purse seiners: 90 
•   84 vessels with a GRT ≤250 and hold 
capacity ≤120m3   
•   6 vessels with: 250 < GRT >800 t and 
holding capacity of 120m3     
 
 
•   Minimum mesh size: 25-30 mm 
•   Minimum landing size: 18mm (Decree no 
109/05) 
i.e. Fuel subsidies 
 
•   Restriction on net size 
•   Prohibition of beach seine  




•   TAC set at 224,869 tons 
 
Tax on harvest: harvest 
quota tax in $ per ton 
•   IVQ  
•   Landings should take place at base 
ports 




Time and area 
restrictions 
•   Closed seasons: only applies to horse 
mackerel Species-May-August  
   
•   Closed areas: Estuaries and bays 
•   Smaller purse seiners should operate 
beyond 2nm (4nm beyond closed bays 
and ports)  
•   Larger vessels should operate beyond 
4  nm (6 nm beyond closed bays and 
ports)    
Source: Own table, information from Angolan Fisheries Directorate (2014). 
The management approach sees the MCS system as one of the pillars of the IVQ system 
supported by the inspectors at the landing points and vessel-monitoring systems (VMS) 
installed in the all fleet. The information collected at the landing sites specifies landings weight, 
species, and name of the vessel. This brings about great advantage for controlling the individual 
landings in each terminal, making it possible to undertake an accurate control of vessels’ 
landings. Illegal activities such as misreporting and quota busting are considered serious 
offences (Article 21, Fishery Law n.° 6-A/04), and serious corrective measures can be taken 
by the authorities (Article 23, Fishery Law n.° 6-A/04).  
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2.4 Fishing capacity and effort 
 
 
Recognizing the existing overcapacity in the fishing fleet, the Angolan Government 
took action to establish a balance between available resources and fishing capacity through 
limited entry. The fleet capacity was significantly reduced in recent years due to changes in 
management measures (see table 5). The small pelagic fleet in 2014 consisted of 90 licensed 
purse seine vessels with a total GRT of around 7,500 tons and total fleet power of around 
31,250 HP. Based on the vessels size (length), the fleet is classified into two segments, namely 
the semi-industrial and industrial segment. Vessels considered semi-industrial range from 15 
to 20 m of LOA, while, industrial are those with at least 21 m LOA. The industrial segment 
comprises 36 out of 90 purse seiners. These have on average 31 m LOA and 600 HP and usually 
fitted with brine freezers and their hull material is mainly steel. The semi-industrial on the other 
hand, comprises of 54 purse seiners, with an average LOA of 18m, and 376 HP; mostly fitted 
with RSW or no freezing facility at all. Most have wooden or fiberglass hull material. 
           Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on the southern fishing zone, 
namely Benguela and Namibe provinces that harbors 64% of the purse seine fleet that is 58 out 
of 90 vessels. On average, a company owns three vessels, and they may be a multi-vessel, or a 
single vessel company. The two fishing towns have nearly the same fleet capacity, as illustrated 
in table 6. the fleet in Benguela comprises 31 vessels with a total GRT of 3,406 tons and a total 
engine capacity of 14,001 HP. Whereas, the Namibe comprises 27 vessels with a total GRT of 
3,386 and total engine capacity of 16,432 HP.  
             Table 6. Average size of the operating fleet in Benguela and Namibe 
  Benguela Namibe 
Number of purse seiners 
Average LOA (m) 
31 
24 








Average crew per vessel (men) 10 17 
              Source: Own table, information from Angolan Fisheries Directorate (2014). 
In principle, fishing takes place all year round (except for horse mackerel, see table 5), 
unless when the vessels have to stay onshore for repairs and maintenance. However, in general, 
vessels are actively involved in fishing for about 200 days a year, performing on average 110 
fishing trips that are relatively of short duration, usually 12-48 hours. An average purse seiner 
consumes up to 250 thousand litres of fuel per fishing year. 
 
14 
2.5 Landings and trade 
 
The SPF fleet has a long history dating back to the early 1950s when total catches 
already exceeded 300 thousand tons. After a decline in 1960, production increased and reached 
nearly 600 thousand tons in 1972 (Capricorn Fisheries Monitoring. 2012). At present, with the 
participation of 90 vessels, total annual catches are estimated around 180 thousand tons with a 
corresponding value estimated at USD 216 million.  
By volume the catches of schooling, pelagic species caught by purse seiners would be 
considered the largest fishery, landings account for about 60% of the total catches in the 
country (DNP, 2014). The catch composition may consist of several species. However, horse 
mackerel, sardinellas and jack mackerel are the three most important species for the industry. 
Sardinellas account for about 2/3 of the total catch; however, the landing value of horse 
mackerel may be three times higher than that of sardinella.  
During fishing operations, catches are recorded in logbooks on board by vessel 
operators (or onboard inspectors in industrial vessels) and submitted to the local fisheries 
office. The logbooks contain catch and effort information, e.g. kg or ton per species or group 
of species, duration of fishing trips and fishing zone. Inspectors are understood to check 
landings records against catch records. In 2014, the two southern provinces, Benguela and 
Namibe, accounted for about 27% (51.3 thousand tons) and 32% (58.4 thousand tons) of the 
overall small pelagic landings, respectively. The annual catch composition and monthly 




Figure 2. Monthly landings of small pelagic in 
Benguela. Fishing towns in 2014.The catch 
composition comprises of sardinellas, horse mackerel 
and other species, representing an average of around 
66%, 27% and 7% respectively. On average, monthly 
landing was around 4.2 thousand. Lower catches of 
horse mackerel are primarily due to effort reduction 
and closing season (May-August). All figures are in 
thousand tons.  
Source: Data collected from (DNP, 2014), figures 
generated by the author. 
 Figure 3. Monthly landings of small pelagic in 
Namibe fishing town in 2014.The catch composition 
comprises of sardinellas, horse mackerel and other 
species, representing an average of around 64%, 28% 
and 8% respectively. On average, monthly landing 
was around 4.4 thousand. Lower catches of horse 
mackerel are primarily due to effort reduction and 
closing season (May-August). All figures are in 
thousand tons.  
Source: Data collected from (DNP, 2014), figures 
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           Fish trade 
 
Horse mackerel (Trachurus spp.) is the most valuable species due to its high demand 
and price in the local market. This major species is reportedly the one that gives harvesting 
firms in the small pelagic fishery, economic sustainability. It is among the preferred staple food 
in Angola, and the market price can vary from 1.60 to 2.60 USD per kilo. This fish is usually 
sold immediately after or during landings, mostly frozen and boxed into 20-30kg cartoons. It 
may also be sold fresh but in minor quantities. The total catch within the Angolan waters are 
not enough to meet the local demand. As a result, the Angolan Fisheries Ministry has 
established horse mackerel imports quota (up to 90 thousand tons per year) in order to meet 
the national demand. 
Despite higher landing volumes (about 2/3 of the total small pelagic species), sardinella 
(S. maderensis and S. aurita) are considered as low value species, usually consumed by low-
income people, and used as raw material in the fishmeal and oil reduction industry. The market 
price can vary from as low as 0.4 to 1.00 USD per kilo. Other species such as small tunas in 
the scombridae family may have higher demand and market value. However, they are not 
caught in larger volumes as the other two stated above.  
Upon landing, sardinella catch may be sold as fresh fish, blast frozen, and boxed in 
cartoons. Fresh fish is usually sold to small retailers, usually women (fishmongers) who sell in 
the local markets. It may also be sold in bulk to artisanal processors who usually salt and dry 
then sell big piles to other cities and even neighbouring countries like Congo and Zambia. 
Larger quantities of landed fresh fish can also be sold to processing plants for reduction purpose 
(fishmeal and oil). Fishmeal and fish oil exports values in 2014 were USD 16.065.500 and 
USD 107.156, respectively.  
Producers who own freezing facilities onshore may however, sell the catch as either 
fresh or frozen boxed into 20-25kg cartoons. That is supplied to major institutional clients, 
usually in large quantities to wholesalers and minor quantities to women traders who sell in the 
local markets. The ex-vessel price varies as a function of supply and demand of fish. It is 






CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
  
3.1 Literature review  
The aim of this section is to review previous research studies related to the present one. 
Since this study attempts to analyse and compare the productivity and economic performance 
of a fleet, it was necessary for the author to consult available literature on similar studies. 
Farrell (1957) suggested that productivity or efficiency reflects the firm’s ability to 
obtain maximum output from a given set of inputs. Meanwhile, allocative efficiency reflects 
the firm’s ability to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices and the 
production technology. These two measures are then combined to provide a measure for the 
total economic efficiency (Coelli at al., 2005). Thus, Economic efficiency as defined by (Henry 
et al, 1976)  refers to the use of resources in such a way that maximizes the production of goods 
and services at the lowest possible cost. In relative terms, one economic system is more 
efficient than another if can provide more goods and services for the society without using 
more resources. Economic efficiency is one way to measure the economic performance. 
Economic performance, however, is assessed by relating the value of output to the real cost of 
inputs needed (Coglan and Pascoe, 1997). In practice, assessment of the economic performance 
of fisheries is derived from economic surveys of the individual fishers participating in the 
fishery (FAO, 2009). On his research, Hao (2012), argued that regular surveys of economic 
performance are undertaken in order to assess the requirements of the respective fisheries 
policy.  
Many authors presented economic performance and technical efficiency results through 
the measurement of technical and economic efficiency of fishing fleets using various methods 
such as the Stochastic Frontier Production Function and Data Envelopment Analysis methods. 
In this study the author adapted to a method proposed by Flaaten et al., (1995) and Kim Anh 
et al., (2006), through which, economic performance indicators are based on the accounting 
ratios such as profitability, the ratio of net profit to gross revenue, and the ratio of net profit to 
the capital value.  
In the United States, two researchers from the University of Hawaii’s Joint Institute for 
Marine and Atmospheric Research (JIMAR), Marcia Hamilton and Steve Huffman carried out 
costs and earnings study of Hawaii’s small boat pelagic fishery in 1995 and 1996. Data, 
collected through surveys consisted of information on vessel physical and operational 
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characteristics, investment capital, fixed and variable costs, as well as annual landings quantity 
and value. Findings showed that, the average annual fixed costs accounted for large proportion 
in total cost. Fixed costs were higher for pelagic vessels as compared to non-pelagic vessels. 
Fuel consumption was the most significant variable cost and varied according to vessel size 
and gear type. 
In the UK, under the Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources 
(CEMARE) Coglan and Pascoe (2001), presented the results of an economic and financial 
performance study of the UK English Channel fleet. Data was collected through economic 
surveys of the fishery undertaken in 1995-97. The sample size was that of 100 boats and was 
stratified by port, size and engine power. The key information included financial indicators 
such as costs, revenue; and operational characteristics such as crew size and vessel age. Results 
indicate that: for vessel age, engine power and corresponding vessel capacity units, are the 
major factors that may have affected the average costs and revenues of vessels.  
In Bangladesh, Swati (2012), presented the results of an economic study of gillnet 
marine fishery in coastal areas. The aim of the study was to document the socio-demographic 
profile of gillnet fishermen and determine costs and returns of the fishery. Data was collected 
through personal interviews, from 60 SSF boats, randomly selected in Cox´s Bazar coast. 
Tabular analysis and quantitative data analysis was performed in order to identify and measure 
the effects of production factors on revenue. The results also show that higher level of efforts 
resulted in larger catch as well as higher level of net revenue. Panayotou production function 
analysis shows that all explanatory variables were statistically significant and had positive 
effect in increasing revenue from the fishery. 
In Vietnam, Nguyen Duy (2010), evaluated the economic performance and efficiency 
of gillnet vessels in Nha Trading. The aim of the research was to find out whether the fleet was 
profitable and efficient or not. Based on a cost and earning survey, data on 58 vessels was 
collected and analysed. Empirical results indicate that an average a vessel earns a gross profit 
margin of 17.3% and a profit margin of 3.8%. The average annual crew income is 74.5% more 
than the local average income per capita. Efficiency analysis of the vessels based on Salter-
diagram application shows that vessels with high relative standardized effort are the most cost 
efficient and derived intra-marginal rent. On average, government fuel subsidies led to 17.5% 
increase in gross cash flow, and 36% of profit per vessel. 
Still in Vietnam, Nguyen Duy (2010), evaluated the economic performance and 
efficiency of gillnet vessels in Nha Trading. The aim of the research was to find out whether 
the offshore fishing fleet was profitable and efficient or not. Based on a costs and earning 
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survey, data on 58 vessels was collected and analysed. The empirical results indicate that an 
average gillnet vessel earns a gross profit margin of 17.3% and a profit margin of 3.8%. The 
average annual crew income is 74.5% more than the local average income per capita. 
Efficiency analysis of the vessels basing on an application of the Salter-diagram shows that 
vessels with high relative standardized effort are the most cost efficient both in the short- and 
long-run. Majority of these cost efficient vessel derived intra-marginal rent from the fishery. 
On average, government fuel subsidies led to 17.5% increase in gross cash flow, and 36% of 
profit per vessel. The study also demonstrates that engine capacity, fishing gear and fishing 
day are the factors best reflecting fishing effort of the vessels. 
In the European Union, economic performance of selected European fishing fleets was 
assessed within the EU fisheries: Economic Assessment of European Fisheries (Q5CA-2001-
01502-2004). The study was carried out in marine fisheries of 20 countries, of which 86 
specific segments of fishing fleets were included. Main characteristics, economic and technical 
indicators, economic performance of the fishing fleets in 2003 were discussed. The economic 
indicators were landing value, gross value added, gross cash flow and net profit. For calculating 
and evaluating capital costs, the replacement value of the vessel was used to calculate 
depreciation. An imputed interest was computed, reflecting the opportunity cost of the capital 
invested in the vessel as there was a widely difference in actual interest cost per vessel in 
different countries. 
In Brazil, Almeida et al. (2001), presented the results of an economic analysis of the 
Santarem commercial fishing fleet in 1997 in lower Amazonian fisheries based on 50 
interviews with boat operators whose main gear was gill nets. The fleet was homogeneous in 
terms of hull design and gear operations, but different in size. Results show that smaller boats 
had higher economic efficiency in terms of income in relation to expense, but had less in terms 
of catch per unit effort than larger boats. Greater economic efficiency of small boats was 
explained in terms of labour, fishing and marketing strategies, whereas the large boats faced 
small domestic market size. The crew payment was the biggest expenses of the fishing activity, 
30% for smallest boats and 63% for the largest. 
Flaaten at al. (1995), studied the economic efficiency of Norwegian Purse Seine Fleets. 
This was processed by comparing the profitability of vessels with no license with the 
profitability of vessels with license fees. The results show that vessels that purchased licenses 
have significantly lower profitability than the other vessel group. This is due to the owners who 
bought licenses along with vessels have higher capital costs. Another report of Flaaten (2008), 
compared the economic performance indicators of some major fishing vessel groups in Khanh 
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Hoa of Vietnam in 2004 and 2005. It is proved that the two inshore vessel groups had a contrast 
in economic performance: a negative profit margin for small-scale trawlers and a positive profit 
margin for anchovy purse seiners, whereas the offshore gillnetters and offshore longliners had 
positive net profits in percentage of gross revenue.  
U. Tietze and R. Lasch (2002-2003) under the FAO, performed studies on economic 
performance and fishing efficiency. Results show that all 94 fishing vessels covered had a 
positive gross cash flow and fully recovered their operating costs, with no losses. When also 
considering capital costs, i.e. the costs of depreciation and interest, 88 of the 94 types of vessels 
or 94 percent showed a net profit after deducting the costs of depreciation and interest. To 
assess the economic and financial performance of fishing vessels, two indicators were used. 
The NCF, and NCF/total earnings (TE) ratio, as well as NCF/return on investment.  
Thean et al (2011), under the Department of Agribusiness, performed a study on the 
technical efficiency of the Penang Trawl Fishery in Malaysia. The research examined the score 
of technical efficiency and factors causing inefficiency of 69 surveyed trawl vessels in Penang. 
Technical and operational information such as gross holding capacity, engine power, fuel 
consumption and landings per trip were collected through a survey. Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) was applied to examine trawl vessels efficiency. Results showed that the score 
of technical efficiency among vessels was estimated to be 57%. It was realised that echo 
sounder was the only factor with positive significant effects on technical efficiency. While, 
factors related to skipper characteristics such as family background, education and experience 
of captains however, had negative effects on technical inefficiency of the vessels.  
Several broad analyses of fuel consumption in fisheries have been undertaken in recent 
decades e.g. (Thrane, 2004; Schau et al., 2009). Results of these studies suggest that fuel use 
intensity (FUI) varies greatly between fisheries targeting different species, employing different 
gears, and fishing in different regions. Generally, fisheries targeting small pelagic species and 
employing purse seine gear perform relatively well when compared to higher trophic level 
species caught with trawl or longline. A recent study in Galicia (Spain) one of Europe's most 
important fishing regions, identified aquaculture and fishery activities as responsible for 
approximately 3% of the total GHG emissions of that region in 2008. Robert et al (2014), 
measured fuel inputs to purse seining vessels targeting primarily skipjack (Katsuwonus 
pelamis) and yellowfin (Thunnus alba- cores) tuna. Data reported represent that these vessels 
burned, on average, 368 L of fuel per tonne of wet weight landings. This corresponds to a fuel-
related carbon footprint of 1.1 kg CO2 per landed kg of tuna, lower than that of average marine 
capture fisheries as well as most forms of land-based animal protein production.  
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3.2 Theoretical framework 
 
This section provides the key concepts, theories, and models that support and guide this 
thesis. Therefore, justifications shall be grounded on this section in addition to literature review 
on the previous section.  Section 3.2.3 to 3.3.7 was mainly adapted from Flaaten (2016). 
                          
                                    3.2.1 Operation of purse seine gears  
 
Seines and surrounding nets are fishing gears that encircle dense schools of fish on, or 
near the surface with a large wall of net. The net is then drawn together underneath the fish to 
make an artificial pond. There are a number of techniques, working from either a single vessel 
or two craft. Which utilize variations in the rigging and operating procedures (Sainsbury, 
1996). This is often a fuel intensive method due to the searching times and distances that may 
be involved. Modern purse seine can be 1000 m long and 200 m deep, i.e. a fine- meshed wall 
covering an area of 200.000 m2 Larsen (2011). They are predominantly used for pelagic, 
schooling species. 
For very fast swimming species like tunas, a two boat operation, including a skiff, is 
mainly used. In fisheries for slower swimming fish like mackerel, herring, and sardines, it is 
more common to use a one-boat operation. Modern purse seiners are equipped with mechanical 
equipment such as triplex power block, net hauler and net winch that help in deploying, 
maneuvering and hauling the net during operations, as well as fish finding equipment such as 
Eco sounders and sonars (Sainsbury, 1996). Eco sounders are useful in locating fish, but during 
the tactics of deploying, the net the sonar is more useful for following the depth, swimming 
direction and speed of the school (Larsen 2011).  
 
Figure 4. Steps in purse seine operations (Larsen, 2011). Source: own figure. 
1
•Starting to deploy the purse seine.
2
•The net is out and its wall has sunk, surrounding the school. The 
purse line is hauled and the purse seine starts to close in the 
bottom, preventing fish from escaping.
3
•As the purse line is hauled, access net is hauled on board 
through the power block. Fish are being concentrated. 
4
•In the final stage, fish are dried and they are brought on board 
usually through a fish pump.
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            3.2.2 Cost and earning concepts  
 
The cost and earning definitions used in this study correspond in principle to those used 
in business economic analysis in general and in previous economic performance studies of 
fishing vessels. The main economic performance indicators include those related to cost and 
revenue of fishing operations. The definitions are adapted from Duy N, Flaaten O and Long L 
(2015).  
Table 7. Definitions of the performance indicators 
   Gross revenue (=Landing value) 
 
  -Variable operating costs (i.e. cost of fuel, lubricant, ice, provision and minor repairs) 
= Income     
-   Fixed operating costs (i.e. maintenance costs and insurance) 
-   Labor costs 
=  Earnings before interest taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) 
-   Depreciation 
=  Operating profit (EBIT)    
-   Interest payment on loans     
=  Pretax profit (EBT)     
-   Calculated interests on the owners capital 
=  Rent (i.e. IMR or EMR)    
     Operating cash flow (OCF) margin=EBITDA/Gross revenue 
     Operating margin=EBT/Gross revenue 
     Return on capital value (ROC)=(EBT+Interest payment on loans)/Total capital value 
     Return on equity (ROE)=EBT/Vessel owners capital 
 
Source: Duy et al (2015).  
EBITDA mainly reflects the cash a fishing firm has earned from its fishing operation. 
A positive EBITDA indicates that the gross revenue (GR) exceeds the vessel operational and 





Meanwhile rent is an EP indicator that measures the efficiency of a producer from 
society’s perspective. Rent (i.e. IMR) is referred to as the economic profit society of employing 
the owner’s capital in fishing activity after subtracting all expenses, including the opportunity 
cost of this capital.  
If the revenue generated by the industry (gross revenue) exceeds the real cost of the 
factors of production (operating costs), the resultant positive rent implies that the fishery is 
efficient and profitable for society. If rent is negative while while EBITDA is positive, vessel 
owners may be commercially viable in the short run, but not operating optimally, based upon 
a long-term analysis of allocating society resources efficiently.  
Costs incurred include the invested capital on the fishing vessel. The hull, mechanical 
and electronic equipment as well as fishing gears, together with the operational costs. Those 
costs involved in maintaining the functioning of the fishing vessel are termed as fixed costs. 
They include maintenance and repairs, insurance, license fees, and administrative costs.  
Those costs that are incurred in catching and landing fish are known as variable costs. 
They are directly related to the number of fishing trips, and includes fuel and lubricants, ice, 
provisions for the crew, and materials such as twine used in repair of fishing gear at sea. (FAO, 
2001). In addition, vessel owners have to take into account the capital costs i.e. the accumulated 
depreciation and interest on capital loan (. Tietze and Lasch 2003).  
A far as share of income is concerned, it is a common practice to manage a vessel as a 
form of joint enterprise between owner and crew, in such a manner that both share in the 
success, or lack thereof, of each trip. Under such an arrangement, earnings and expenses are 
allocated between owner and crew in a prearranged proportion (Duy, 2010). Often the boat or 
fixed expenses are charged to the boat (owner), while variable expenses are either subtracted 
directly from gross earnings before making the split, or charged to the crew’s share of earnings. 
Whatever detailed accounting arrangement is used, the split is balanced so that the owner 
receives a reasonable return on his investment capital, while crew are reward for their work, 
both parties being encouraged to run and efficient operation and maximize returns.  
Productivity is commonly defined as a ratio between the output volume and the volume 
of inputs (Henry et al, 1976). In this study, it refers to how efficient production inputs, such as 





            3.2.3 Fishing effort and production 
 
Fisheries management authorities traditionally plays a key role in managing fishing 
capacity and effort. Capacity may be defined in terms of numbers and size of vessels whereas 
effort is related to the use of vessels in fishing. Fishing effort is a key concept in bioeconomic 
models, relative resource assessment, and regulation in marine capture fishery. FAO (2009), 
defines fishing effort as the combined effect of the inputs used in fishing, including fixed 
components of vessel and variable components.  
The use of the variable inputs and the fixed capital components makes up the overall 
input base as an aggregate input that is underlying the measure of total fishing effort in order 
to generate catch (FAO, 2009). Beverton and Holt (1957), related effort to fishing power that 
is measurement of the potential ability of a vessel to catch fish. Fishers encounter the stock 
with what is called fishing effort. Frequently relating to a given combination of inputs into the 
fishing activity. Examples of effort in the purse seine fishery are hours or days hours of fishing. 
Smith (1996) measured effort of the Dutch cutter fleet from the fishing capacity based on 
engine power and the number of days at sea, in which the engine power of vessels of different 
sizes was weighted according to their economic productivity. Flaaten, (2016), expressed effort 
based in the production function such that   
(3.1.)      E = Ψ(v1 ,..., vn ).  
Where E is effort and v1 to vn are fishing inputs. This is basically a regular production 
function from the theory of the firm where inputs may have constant returns to scale or variable 
returns to scale. But, the difference is that E is not the final output like in most firms. Any 
production firm, uses a set of inputs called factors of production to produce a level of output. 
With regard to this, a fish harvesting firm uses inputs such as gear, fuel and labour to catch and 
land fish. Catch is therefore the output in a harvesting firm. However, a fish harvesting firm 
differs from any other firm for instance a manufacturing firm, in the sense that a harvesting 
firm can vary the amount of all other inputs, except the size of the stock. Unlike, Factors like 
fish migration for spawning and feeding and year classes are the basis for the variability of 
most stocks in certain areas and times- making fish more available for fishers in different areas 
at different times of the year. Production is therefore as function of E and X.                                                         
H = f (E, X). Where H is the harvest, and E and X are effort and stock respectively. This 
function is described as a short-run production function. It is only valid for a given stock level 
at any point in time.  
 
24 
            3.2.4 Bioeconomic models  
 
The the traditional bioeconomic model in figure 5 below was adapted from Gordon 
(1954). It comprises of a total revenue (TR) function and a total cost (TC) function as a function 
of effort (E). The TR of a fishery, equals to the quantity harvested multiplied by the price per 
unit of harvest (p). Whereas, the TC is the product of fishing effort and the cost per unit of 
effort (a). TC is then dependent on a, and the efficiency of each fishing vessel and its crew. It 
is important to highlight that p and a in the model below were assumed constant across time 
and quantity. Based on the sustainable yield curve the TR and TC can be represented by the 
following equations:  
(3.3)	  	  	  	  	  	  𝑇𝑅 𝐸 = 𝑝.𝐻(𝐸) 
(3.4)     𝑇𝐶 𝐸 = 𝑎. 𝐸 
From equation 3.3, the average revenue (AR) and the marginal revenue (MR) per unit 
effort functions can be derived. The AR(E) = TR(E) / E, and MR(E) = dTR(E) / dE. The AR(E) 
shows the revenue generated per unit effort, while, MR(E) shows the change in TR as a result 
of a small change in effort. On the same mode, average cost (AC) and marginal MC marginal 
cost can be derived from equation 3.4 as: AC(E)=TC(E)/E and MC(E) = dTC(E) / dE. AC(E) 
shows the cost per unit effort while, MC(E) shows the change in total cost as a result of a small 
change in effort. 
 
Figure 5. Traditional bioeconomic model (Flaaten, 2016) 
Vessels will enter the fishery if: AR(E) > a, and exit the fishery if: AR(E) < a. However, 
when: AR(E) = MC(E), there will be an economic equilibrium called bionomic equilibrium. At 
this point there is neither an incentive to leave nor incentive to enter the fishery. The total rent 
of the fishery is defined as	 π (E) = TRE(E) − TC(E). However, from the optimality rule, 
resource rent is maximized when MC(E) = MR(E). This is the economic reference point at 
effort level, EMEY (Flaaten, 2016).  
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                                   3.2.5 Fishing vessels economics  
 
 
This section deals with application of basic microeconomic theories to the operation of 
fishing vessels. It includes the economic objectives of fishing activities, differences in cost 
structure, market prices and opportunity cost of fishing inputs such as labour and capital in 
heterogeneous vessels. 
Suppose, e is the level of effort of an individual fishing vessel. Then, the total cost of 
effort is: 
(3.5) tc(e) = c(e)+f, 
where c(e) is the variable cost and f the fixed cost. Similarly, the average cost of effort: 
ac(e) = tc(e)/e, and the marginal cost of effort: mc(e) = dtc(e)/de. Example, if effort of a purse-
seiner is measured in fishing hours, the average variable cost tells how many $ one hour of 
fishing on average costs, whereas marginal cost tells by how many $ total cost increases with 
the addition of one fishing hour.  
The fishing effort can be varied by changing the inputs. For instance, the purse seiner 
operator may decide to vary its speed from the harbour to the fishing ground. If the skipper 
decides on increasing the sailing speed, that will mean less sailing time and more fishing time. 
However, fuel consumption increases with increasing speed and that implies increasing 
marginal costs in response to increasing effort.   
At individual vessel level, the harvest (h) in a given period of time is a function of effort 
(e), stock size (X) and catchability coefficient (q). Thus, adapted from Schaefer linear harvest 
function:	  ℎ 𝑒; 𝑋 = 𝑞𝑒𝑋. Then, the operating profit of the vessel is: 
(3.6) 𝜋 𝑒; 𝑋 = 𝑝𝑞𝑒𝑋 − 𝑐(𝑒). 
Where c(e) is the cost per unit effort. The cost per unit of harvest will depend on both 
input costs and on the stock level and its catchability.  
Like any other firm, a fish harvesting firm may have different strategies for its short-
run and its long-run adaptation.
 
In the short run it aims to cover operation cost whereas in the 
long run the operator will have to cover its fixed cost as well. The marginal and average costs 
are based on the total cost tc(e)= c(e) + k, with c(e) as variable cost and k as fixed cost. Marginal 





                                    3.2.6 Vessels cost efficiency and intra-marginal rent  
 
Heterogeneous fishing vessels may vary with respect to size, engine power, holding 
capacity and other technical and economic characteristics, that leads to variations in fishing 
power, in other words, variation in fishing effort among the vessels (Pascoe and Robinson, 
1996).  
 
Figure 6. Cost efficiency of heterogeneous vessels in cost per unit of standardized effort. The fishing 
effort of each vessel is measured by the width of the bar whereas the height of the bar measures cost 
per unit of effort (Flaaten, 2016).  
The vessels in figure 6, are arranged from the left to the right according to their cost 
efficiency, with vessel no. 1 as the most cost efficient one and vessel no. 12 as the least cost 
efficient. Vessel no. 9 for example, was chosen as the standard against which the efforts of the 
others are measured. Since the width of each vessel bar illustrates the standardised effort of 
each vessel, it was noticed that, for example, vessel no. 3 produces about twice as much effort 
as the standard vessel, no. 9. This implies that vessel no. 3 would catch twice as much fish per 
day as vessel no. 9, when effort is measured in hours or days of fishing of the standard vessel. 
Further, it was noticed that the average cost per unit of standardised effort is lowest for vessel 
no. 1, even though this vessel no. 1 produces the same effort as the standard vessel no.  
In case of heterogeneous fishing effort, the most cost- efficient vessels do make above-
normal profit, called intra-marginal rent (IMR). Differences in cost and revenue per unit effort 
may also result from vessels operating in different geographical areas. For example, fishers 
living in a small coastal community far away from larger towns and cities usually have few 
alternative employment possibilities; thus the opportunity cost of labour will be lower in such 
a community than in larger labour markets. On the other hand, other inputs required for fishing 
may be costlier in small fishing communities than in towns, due to transportation cost and less 
competition between distributors. Thus, differences in efficiency of effort, market prices of 
inputs and opportunity cost of labour may all contribute to the existence of heterogeneous effort 
in the fish harvesting industry.  
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                                   3.2.7 Fishing licence and harvest quota  
 
 
Fishing licenses and harvest quota are examples of input and output controls, 
respectively. They are also known as effort and catch management instruments. In actual 
fisheries the initial distribution of the fishing rights, such as vessel licences, and harvest quotas 
are often heavily debated. A vessel licence is a permission to register and use a vessel for 
commercial fishing. The licence may or may not specify limits of the vessel characteristics, for 
example, length (metres), weight (GRT), hold volume (cubic metres) or engine power (HP or 
kilowatt), and the type of gear (for example, trawl, long-line or purse seine). The focus is on 
harvest quotas as management tools without discussing explicitly the use of licences. In 
principle, input controls might also refer to limits placed upon other vital supplies of fishing 
such as the amount of fuel use in mechanised fisheries. Licensing fishing vessels is therefore a 
way by which effort management may be stablished. For example, the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreements (Article 18) require Flag State to control its vessels through licenses, 
authorisations or permits to fish in the high seas.  
Output regulations related to the harvest of fish are called quotas – be it total harvest 
quotas (TAC) or harvest quotas per enterprise, vessel (IVQ) or fisher (IFQ). Some of the 
regulatory instruments may be transformed into market instruments, such as tradable quotas 
(ITQ). For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on Individual Vessel Harvest Quota (IVQ). 
That is a non-transferable quota allocated per individual licensed vessel, where direct limits are 
placed upon the tonnage of fish that may be caught per vessel in a period of time; the system 
allocates a Maximum Capture Limits per Vessel, and should not in principle, bring any 
opportunity cost to the quota, as there is no alternative use of it.  
The main characteristic of the system is the non-transferability of rights and it 
comprises complementary mechanisms to counteract eventual social distress due to the 
rationalization of fishing activities. They are attached to the vessel itself and the fishing license. 
Should a boat be scrapped, its remaining rights can be accumulated to other boats belonging to 
the same boat owner. Should a boat not fully utilise its rights in a given season, it cannot 
accumulate the remaining rights to the following season. According to Aranda (2011), the 
introduction of the IVQ system in the Peruvian pelagic fishery, responds to the need of 
rationalising the fishing activity directed to the fishery of anchoveta. The IVQ scheme 
incorporates mechanisms to assure holders that the management environment will not change 
throughout the validation period. Example 10-year in Peru. These mechanisms take the form 
of a Contract of Permanence of the IVQ regime (Aranda, 2011).   
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            3.2.8 Harvest tax and subsidies        
 Indirect management instruments include taxes, fees and subsidies. Taxes can be used 
to discourage the expansion of effort and can be regarded as an instrument to reduce effort, 
while, subsidies would encourage an expansion of effort and can be disregarded as an 
instrument to reduce effort in the direction of EMEY. Corrective taxes can in theory bring 
marginal private costs into alignment with marginal social costs. Such instruments are called 
Pigouvian taxes. In principle, studying the effects of Pigouvian taxes on fishing effort, as well 
as on resources, is an excellent point of departure for studies in fisheries management.  
Therefore, on his work, Flaaten, (2016), looked into the effects of taxes on fish harvest. 
He pointed out that, the manager’s task is to find the tax rate, on harvest, that adjusts effort to 
optimum points such as  EMSY or EMEY levels. This requires an extensive knowledge about 
the biological and economic characteristics of the fishery, expressed in equations 3.2; 3.3 and 
3.4. Suppose, the manager has all necessary information freely available: tH = tax per unit 
harvest (for example, $ per kg or tonne of fish caught). With a harvest tax the total private 
revenue of fishers equals: 
(3.7)  TRP(E)=(p−tH )H(E)  
where p and H are the price of fish and of harvest, respectively. The subscript p on TR 
is what the private industry receives as net of taxes. The other part, equal to thH(E), is the 
government’s tax revenue. Then, total revenue of the fishery, pH(E), equals the sum of private 
and government revenues. The tax rate th is measured in $ per kg or per tonne.  
          A fisheries subsidy is a government action that confers an advantage on fish 
harvesters or consumers in order to supplement their income or lower their cost (FAO, 2009). 
Fisheries subsidies come in many shapes and forms such as fuel tax rebate; fuel cost support 
and compensation; provision of landing site facilities; and no resource access fees. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the focus is on fuel cost support subsidies where costs of fuel for fishing 
vessels are lowered. In the EU for instance, fuel subsidies for fishers within member states 
consist mainly of fuel tax exemptions with respect to the excise taxes directed at specific fuels 
(Council Directive 2003/96/EC). Theoretically, subsidies are expected to increase profit in the 
short term, but not in the long run. It is acknowledged that some forms of fisheries subsidies 
can threaten the sustainability of fisheries resources by encouraging overcapacity and excess 
fishing effort, thus reducing the long-term viability of the fishing industry (2002, WSSD).  
 
29 
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
4.1 The study area 
The study area falls within the Angolan EEZ, in the southern fishing zone, more 
precisely in the municipalities of Baia Farta (12° S, 13° E) and Tombwa (15° S, 11° E), in 






Figure 7. Study area, Benguela and Namibe fishing zones and landing terminals 
Source: https://www.google.no/angola_mapa.co.ao . Edited by the author.  
The surveyed sites, were five (5) fish harvesting firms in the municipality of Baia Farta-
Benguela, and six (6) harvesting firms in the municipality of Tombwa-Namibe, at their 
respective landing terminals. Namibe and Benguela, represent the first and second largest 
fishing towns in the country, respectively.  
Benguela fishing town 
Namibe fishing town 
Most fish harvesting firms have 
their landing terminals within the 
bays illustrated on the images 
below.   
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4.2 The data collection method 
 
Data was directly collected by the author through semi-structured personal interviews 
with key informants among vessel owners, skippers and vessel or harvesting firm’s managers 
at their respective landing terminals.  
Two main types of information were collected: (1) description of the vessel's physical 
and operational characteristics including hull length, engine power, fuel consumption, duration 
of fishing trip and crew size, and (2) economic and financial data such as invested capital, 
operating costs, and price per unit of harvest concerning the fishing year 2014.  
All data was collected in July and August 2015. In addition, data pertaining the same 
fleet/vessels was directly collected from the Angolan Fisheries Directorate data base and 
logbooks. Particularly effort and catch data, and harvest quota quantity and taxes. 
 
4.3 Sample representativeness  
28 purse-seiners (14 in each fishing town) in a population of 58 were surveyed. The 
sample size was limited to 48% of due to availability of information and operational status of 
certain vessels.  
The sample was stratified into fishing town, and engine power (HP). Based fishing 
towns, the fleet was subdivided into two groups: Benguela and Namibe. While, based on the 
engine horse-power, it was subdivided into three groups: 100< HP≤400; 400 <HP≤700; and 
HP>700. This information is summarized on the table below.	   
Table 8. Distribution of purse-seiners by fishing towns and vessel groups (HP). 
  Benguela Namibe 
Vessel groups Population Sample Population  Sample 
No. % No. % No. % No % 
 
100<HP≤400 19 61% 5 26% 6 22% 4 67% 
 
400 <HP≤700 8 26% 5 63% 15 56% 5 33% 
 
HP>700 4 13% 4 100% 6 22% 5 83% 
Total 
31 100% 14 45% 27 100% 14 52% 
Source: own data and table  
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4.4 Data analysis  
 
With the aid of computer software, (particularly Microsoft Excel) and standard 
economic formulations, the quantitative observations performed were used in the calculation 
of output economic performance and productivity indicators per vessel e.g. EBITDA (earnings 
before interest tax and depreciation), OM (operating margin), ROC (return on capital), CPUE, 
cost per unit of effort, revenue per unit of effort and fuel consumption per unit of catch. The 
general calculation approach for the economic performance indicators presented in chapter 5 
were adapted from Duy N, Flaaten O, and Long L (2015), defined in table 7, chapter 3. 
The fishing effort was the basis for calculating some productivity or efficiency 
indicators of vessels including cost and revenue per unit effort and CPUE. In this study effort 
is considered as the product of vessels engine HP and number of fishing trips performed in the 
year (HP*fishing trips). This approach, according to GFCM (2006), may be appropriate for 
vessels of different dimensions using the same type of gear, as the case of this study.  
Another indicator of productivity is fuel efficiency, in other words the quantity of fuel 
used to land one ton of fish, as well as the cost of fuel as a proportion of fish sales. This was 
calculated as the ratio of annual fuel consumption to annual catch, expressed in liters/tons.  
Fuel use intensity (FUI) created the basis for calculating the environmental productivity 
indicator, namely carbon footprint expressed in kg of carbon CO2 per liter of fuel burned in 
fishing operations. The burning of a liter of diesel on-board fishing vessels results in the 
emission of 2.8 kg CO2-e (Seafish, 1996), resulting in a total GHG-to-fuel ratio of 
approximately 2.8 kg CO2-e per liter consumed. 
The indicators were first compared in terms of values and percentage between fishing 
towns and vessel groups. In order to test for statistically significant differences in the mean 
values of indicators between fishing towns and vessel groups, T-Test for two independent 
samples assuming equal variances, and/or unequal variances (depending on F-Test results) was 
performed. To support the t-test results, 95% Confidence Interval error bars were displayed in 






4.5 Descriptive statistics of technical and operational characteristics  
Table 9 and 10 present a statistical summary of the technical and operational data of 
the 28 surveyed vessels within the fishing towns and vessel groups. All parameters are per 
vessels.  
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of some technical and operational characteristics of the 28 purse seiners 
in Benguela and Namibe. 
Variables 
Vessels -Benguela Vessels -Namibe 
N=14 vessels N=14 vessels 
Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. 
Engine power (HP) 190. 1690 536 415 250 1200 642 345 
Length (m) 14.3 37.0 21.9 7.9 17.0 43.0 26.3 9.2 
GRT (tons) 25.0 364.0 135.8 127.5 40.0 431.0 139.7 138.2 
Age (years) 1.0 24.0 13.1 7.9 6.0 24.0 13.5 7.8 
Crew (persons) 10.0 30.0 17.8 5.2 15.0 27.0 18.6 4.2 
Diesel fuel (1000 liters) 120.0 720.0 278.9 159.8 80.0 360.0 197.7 107.5 
Fishing trips 37.7 135.8 90.1 29.6 59.5 152.5 111.0 24.1 
Catch per vessel (ton) 1000.0 3279.0 1524.1 648.4 551.0 8633.0 2718.0 2714.5 
Catch per trip (tons) 8.0 60.0 19.1 13.8 5.0 88.0 27.4 29.0 
Source: own data and calculations 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics of technical and operational characteristics among vessel groups. 
Variables 
Vessel groups -Benguela Vessel groups -Namibe 
100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 
(N=5) (N=5) (N=4) (N=4) (N=5) (N=5) 
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
HP 268 75 431 19 1135 376 347 67 450 0.0 1070 148 
GRT 58 38 70.5 39 315 82 47 6 60 8 294 125 
Length (m) 16 2 20.3 2 34 4 22 6 19 0.0 37 4 
Age (years) 18 5 11 8 10 10 10 3 7 1 23 4 
Fuel (1000 liters) 232 92 236 106 390 247 115 25 133 34 368 99 
Crew (persons) 15 2.1 22 8 13 2 19 4 21.8 4 15 0.0 
Fishing trips 115 18 93 16 54 15 125 10 123 22 88 16 
Catch (Tons) 1193 242 1588 597 1858 965 847 242 1251 590 5681 2528 
Tons per trip 11 3 15 4 35 17 7 2 10 3 61 21 




The data in tables 9 and 10 indicate that the representative vessels are heterogeneous in 
terms of technical and operational characteristics.  
The average average horse power of the vessels in Benguela fleet is smaller than that 
of Namibe, 536 HP and 642 HP, respectively. However, there is a higher standard deviation 
within the Benguela fleet (SD=415HP in contrast to 345HP). In terms of GRT and LOA, the 
fleet in Namibe is relatively larger as well. In fact, regression analysis results show that two 
variables HP, and GRT are strongly correlated (R2=0.7).  
The annual mean fuel consumption on the other hand, was higher in Benguela, 278.9 
thousand litres, than in Namibe fleet, 197.7 thousand litres. 
In terms of age, the two fleets are nearly the same age, with means of 13.1 and 13.5 
years, respectively. It is should be point out that, some vessels are older than the recorded age. 
Therefore, their age was considered from the acquisition year by the present owner. In fact, 
such vessels may be older since some may have been bought as second hand. Thus, vessel age 
here means the years of ownership by the present owner.  
On average, other operational characteristics such as number of fishing trips and catch 
per trip were also relatively higher in Namibe than in Benguela fleet.  
Among vessel groups, variables such as hull length, GRT, fuel consumption, and catch 
per trip increased with increasing engine size. Meaning, vessels in the group 100< HP≤400 are 
shorter (length), had less tonnage, lower fuel consumption and smaller catch per trip, while 
vessels in the group HP>700 are longer, had more tonnage, higher fuel consumption and larger 
catch per trip in both fishing towns.  
In contrary, vessels in the group 100< HP≤400, performed more fishing trips than those 
in the group HP>700.  As far as average vessel age is concerned, those in the group 100< 
HP≤400, were found to be older (17 years) and those in the group HP>700 the younger (10 
years) in Benguela.  
In Namibe, however, HP>700 were found to be older (23 years) while those in the 
group 400< HP≤700 were younger (7 years). The number of crewmembers in both fishing 
towns was found to be higher in 400< HP≤700 vessel group (21 men) and smaller in HP>700 






4.6 Descriptive statistics of investment capital structure  
 
Tables 11 and 12 present the summary of investment capital (acquisition value and 
replacement values)1 of the fishing vessels re-valued for the year 2014. The capital stock is 
further presented by different components that make the fishing vessel operational such as hull 
and mechanical equipment.  
Table 11. Invested capital of the vessels in Benguela and Namibe 
Variables 
Vessels -Benguela Vessel -Namibe 
N=14 vessels N=14 vessels 
Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. 
Hull 438.2 1565.0 989.3 302.4 313.0 2191.0 1212.9 684.0 
Engine 105.0 375.0 237.1 72.4 75.0 525.0 290.6 163.9 
Mechanical equipment 76.3 272.5 172.3 52.6 54.5 381.5 211.2 119.1 
Electronic equipment 42.0 150.0 94.8 29.0 30.0 210.0 116.3 65.6 
Storage equipment 24.5 87.5 55.3 16.9 17.5 122.5 67.8 38.2 
Fishing gear 75.0 100.0 90.4 5.7 75.0 300.0 166.1 104.6 
Others 14.0 50.0 31.6 9.7 10.0 70.0 38.8 21.9 
Total invested capital 790.0 2600.0 1670.7 484.8 575.0 3800.0 2103.6 1183.2 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel  
 
Table 12. Invested capital among vessel groups 
Variables 
Vessel groups -Benguela Vessel groups -Namibe 
100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 
(N=5) (N=5) (N=4) (N=4) (N=5) (N=5) 
 Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Hull 707.4 187.3 1023.5 197.8 1299.0 186.9 626.0 357.8 954.7 348.4 1940.6 462.1 
Engine 169.5 44.9 245.3 47.4 311.3 44.8 150.0 85.7 228.8 83.5 465.0 110.7 
Mechanical  123.2 32.6 178.2 34.4 226.2 32.5 109.0 62.3 166.2 60.7 337.9 80.5 
Electronic 67.8 17.9 98.1 19.0 124.5 17.9 60.0 34.3 91.5 33.4 186.0 44.3 
Storage equip 39.6 10.5 57.2 11.1 72.6 10.5 35.0 20.0 53.4 19.5 108.5 25.8 
Fishing gear 90.0 0.0 87.0 6.7 95.0 5.8 75.0 0.0 105.0 14.1 300.0 0.0 
Others 22.6 6.0 32.7 6.3 41.5 6.0 20.0 11.4 30.5 11.1 62.0 14.8 
Total capital 1220.0 299.2 1722.0 316.5 2170.0 300.3 1075.0 571.5 1630.0 566.2 3400.0 738.2 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel 
 
                                                   
1 It is important to highlight that for vessels whose acquisition value was not provided, the replacement value 




The total invested capital on the fishing vessels presented on tables 11 and 12 were 
disaggregated into different components that make up the fishing vessel. Namely the hull, 
engine, mechanical equipment, electronic equipment, storage equipment, fishing gear and 
others.  
The vessel hull, mainly include the superstructure and deckhouse, that was the major 
component in terms of invested capital, accounting for about 60% of the total capital. Its 
material varied from wood in smaller purse seiners to fibreglass and steel in larger purse 
seiners.  
The second component in terms of cost was vessel engine. That accounted for an 
average of 15% of total capital cost.  
 Mechanical equipment included the winch, dynamo, lighting system and battery. 
Altogether, mechanical equipment accounted for an average of 10% of the total invested 
capital.  
Most vessels are equipped with some electronic equipment such as compass, sonars 
and short and long-distance communication equipment. In addition, a few vessels use radars, 
particularly the larger ones. On average, electronic equipment accounted for 6% of the 
invested capital of the vessel.  
Not all vessels are equipped with storage equipment. E.g., some smaller vessels 
that fish closer to the shore do not have preservation facilities at all. However, larger 
ones are equipped with RSW and brine freezers. These equipment accounts for minor 
proportions of the invested capital. Around 2%.  
The cost of fishing gear varied according to size. Ranging from 70 thousand to 
300 thousand USD. That accounted for an average of 6% of the total invested capital.  
Comparatively, the fleet in Benguela represent a relatively lower investment capital 
than that of Namibe. With means of 1.6 million USD and 2.1 million USD respectively. 
Moreover, the standard deviation of invested capital in Namibe is 1.18 million compared to 
only 485 thousand USD in Benguela fleet.  
The mean fixed capital increased with engine size in both fishing towns. Vessels in the 
group HP>700 had an invested capital far greater than those in the group 100< HP≤400. For 
instance, within the Benguela fleet, vessels HP>700 on average invested twice the capital of 
those 100< HP≤400. The same vessel group (HP>700), in Namibe fleet invested three times 




4.7 Descriptive statistics of cost structure  
 
                                  4.7.1 Fixed costs 
 
Fixed cost refers to those that did not change with the number of fishing trips performed 
in a fishing year 2014. These generally have to be paid regardless of what state the the fishing 
operations are in. In this study, they are referred to the annual repair and maintenance costs of 
hull, engine, and other equipment on the vessel, as well as fixed salaries, insurance, and harvest 
quota tax for the vessels. 
Table 13. Fixed cost structure of the 28 vessels in Benguela and Namibe. 
Variables 
Vessels -Benguela Vessel -Namibe 
N=14 vessels N=14 vessels 
Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. 
Maintenance 90.0 150.0 122.9 28.4 40.0 200.0 114.3 68.6 
Salary (fixed) 66.0 126.0 102.5 23.9 
 
24.0 118.0 69.2 
 
34.5 
Harvest quota fee 15.0 88.0 35.6 19.9 12.0 528.0 98.4 147.2 
Insurance 1.3 3.8 2.8 0.8 0.9 6.3 3.5 2.0 
Others 18.0 30.0 24.6 5.7 8.0 120.0 50.0 51.4 
Total fixed costs 202.7 394.8 288.3 58.5 78.9 962.3 325.8 279.3 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel per year (2014).  
 
 
Table 14. Fixed costs structure among vessel groups. 
Variables 
Vessel groups -Benguela Vessel groups -Namibe 
100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 
(N=5) (N=5) (N=4) (N=4) (N=5) (N=5) 
 Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Maintenance 116.0 31.3 108.0 23.9 150.0 0.0 57.5 22.2 74.0 21.9 200.0 0.0 
Salary (fixed) 97.4 23.2 99.6 31.1 112.5 17.1 43.5 15.5 44.0 15. 110.2 12.6 
Harvest fee 23.7 7.9 32.8 12.5 54.0 27.0 23.8 14.4 27.6 4.9 228.8 192. 
Insurance 2.0 0.5 2.9 0.6 3.5 0.2 1.8 1.0 2.7 1.0 5.6 1.3 
Others 23.2 6.3 21.6 4.8 30.0 0.0 11.5 4.4 14.8 4.4 116.0 8.9 
Total fixed 
costs 262.3 58.2 264.8 37.6 350 36.2 128.1 41.6 157.2 40.2 652.6 206 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel per year (2014).  
 
From tables 13 and 14 its noted that the mean fixed cost were higher in Namibe fleet, 
325.8 thousand compared to 288thousand USD in Benguela fleet, particularly harvest fees in 
Namibe. However, mean fixed salaries was higher in Benguela fleet, 102 thousand compared 
to 69 thousand USD per vessel year. Among vessel groups fixed costs, particularly 
maintenance and salaries increased with engine sizes in both fishing towns. 
 
37 
           4.7.2 Variable costs 
 
Variable costs are referred to the expenses for all fishing trips in a year. They are the 
result of the average vessel variable cost per fishing trip times the number of fishing trips in 
the year 2014. These costs may increase depending on whether more production is done, and 
how it is done.  
Table 15. Variable costs structure of the vessels in Benguela and Namibe. 
Variables 
Vessels -Benguela Vessel -Namibe 
N=14 vessels N=14 vessels 
Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. 
Diesel fuel 87.6 525.6 203.6 116.7 58.4 379.6 154.9 98.3 
Lubricants 2.6 15.8 6.1 3.5 1.8 11.4 4.6 2.9 
Wage  28.3 187.6 68.3 46.9 14.0 129.5 49.4 36.0 
Ice 4.0 30.0 18.7 10.8 0.0 36.0 14.6 14.0 
Minor repairs 17.5 105.1 40.7 23.3 1.8 75.9 28.8 21.8 
Catering  7.5 30.0 13.3 8.1 3.0 30.0 15.5 11.6 
Others 17.5 105.1 45.3 23.2 14.6 94.9 36.9 25.2 
Total variable costs 179.3 941 395.9 202.6 107.5 535.2 286.6 166.1 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel per year (2014). 
 
Table 16. Variable costs structure among vessel groups. 
Variables 
Vessel groups -Benguela Vessel groups -Namibe 
100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 100< HP≤400  
400 
<HP≤700 HP>700 
(N=5) (N=5) (N=4) (N=4) (N=5) (N=5) 
 Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Diesel fuel 169.9 67.5 172.3 77.5 284.7 180.6 84.6 18.6 97.5 24.7 268.6 72.7 
Lubricants 5.1 2.0 5.2 2.3 8.5 5.4 2.5 0.6 2.9 0.7 8.1 2.2 
Wage  46.5 14.0 92.3 61.4 65.6 50.1 24.6 8.0 40.5 20.8 85.2 37.9 
Ice 16.5 12.5 13.8 9.6 27.5 5.0 6.8 7.9 21.6 19.7 14.0 8.9 
Minor repairs 34.0 13.5 34.5 15.5 56.9 36.1 13.2 6.9 16.4 9.5 53.7 14.5 
Provisions  8.4 0.8 11.2 4.4 21.9 10.7 7.5 6.5 7.5 1.5 30.0 0.0 
Others 38.1 13.6 42.2 20.6 58.0 34.6 19.9 3.6 22.1 4.9 65.4 21.2 
Total  318.5 106.7 371.4 174. 523.2 299.4 153.1 36.0 198.1 69.6 481.8 92.7 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel per year (2014). 
Average variable costs were higher in Benguela, 395.9 thousand in contrast to 286.6 
thousand USD in Namibe fleet. Major differences are in fuel and labour cost (wage), where 
Benguela fleet had higher costs than Namibe. Variable costs of all components show an 




                                   4.7.3 Operating costs 
 
Operating costs are the cost of resources related to the operation of the fishing vessel 
including running costs, repair, maintenance and labour costs (Rose et al, 2000). In this study, 
Labor costs consist of crew wages, fixed salaries and labor charges such as insurance and 
pension funds. Running costs include the costs of fuel, lubricants, preservation and storage of 
fish, food and supplies for the crew. Vessel costs are those of vessel insurance, and maintenance 
and minor repairs expenses. 
 
Table 17. Operating costs structure of the vessels in Benguela and Namibe. 
Variables 
Vessels -Benguela Vessel -Namibe 
N=14 vessels N=14 vessels 
Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D 
Labor cost (salaries and wage) 105.5 313.6 170.8 63.3 41.4 302.2 122.1 88.8 
Running costs (fuel, food, fees) 148.6 784.5 322.5 164.3 104.8 904.4 325.0 268.1 
Vessel costs (maintenance, insur.) 109.8 258.9 166.3 43.0 49.9 282.2 146.6 90.8 
Total Operating costs 368.5 1305.7 659.6 246.6 216.0 1438.4 593.7 437.1 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel per year (2014) 
 
Table 18. Operating costs structure of among vessel groups. 
Variables 
Vessel groups -Benguela Vessel groups -Namibe 
100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 
(N=5) (N=5) (N=4) (N=4) (N=5) (N=5) 
 Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Labor cost 143.9 33.4 191.9 89.0 178.1 57.2 61.3 20.2 70.7 20.0 222.1 73.8 
Running costs 261.8 83.3 277.5 112.7 454.7 240.8 144.9 35.5 179.3 52.7 614.9 256.5 
Vessel costs 152.0 42.4 145.3 21.8 210.5 36.2 72.5 27.9 93.1 31.8 259.3 15.6 
Total OC 557.7 155.8 614.6 203.5 843.2 332.0 278.8 68.0 343.1 100.5 1096.3 337.3 
Unit: thousand USD per vessel per year (2014) 
 
In general, operating costs were higher in Benguela than in Namibe fleet, with means 
of 659.6 thousand and 593.7 thousand USD, respectively. With the exception of running costs 
that were nearly the same in both fleets, all other costs were relatively higher in Benguela fleet.  
Among vessel groups, the mean operating costs increased with increasing engine size 
in both fleets. However, labour cost within the Benguela fleet, was higher in vessel group 400< 







           4.7.4 Capital cost 
 
Capital cost include depreciation and interest paid for the fishing vessel (Rose et al, 
2000) Some vessels in the sample are fully owned by the operators, others were acquired 
through government loans and a few operate under joint venture with foreign investors. With 
a view to eliminating these differences, an imputed interest was calculated. The basis for the 
calculation was the capital value of the vessel, and an assumed annual interest rate of 6%. As 
for annual depreciation, a straight-line depreciation method was used to calculate the 
annual depreciation value:  
 
4.1 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	  	  
	  
Where the cost is the invested capital value on the vessel, the residual is the 
salvage value, estimated at 20% of the investment capital. The depreciation rate varied 
from 6% for the hull to 12% for engine 7% for mechanical equipment, 9% for electronic 
equipment, 6% for storage, and 15% for gear and 7% for others.  
 
Table 19. Calculated capital cost for the fishing vessels in Benguela and Namibe 
Variables 
Vessels -Benguela Vessel -Namibe 
N=14 vessels N=14 vessels 
Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. Min. Max. Mean S.Dev. 
Calculated interest rate 42.0 150.0 94.8 29.0 30.0 210.0 116.3 65.6 
Calculated annual depreciation 51.2 156.2 102.0 28.1 37.8 237.9 131.7 74.0 
Total capital cost 93.2 306.2 196.8 57.1 67.8 447.9 247.9 139.4 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel per year (2014).  
 
 
Table 20. Calculated capital costs among vessel groups 
Variables 
Vessel groups -Benguela Vessel groups -Namibe 
100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700 
(N=5) (N=5) (N=4) (N=4) (N=5) (N=5) 
 Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Calculated IR 67.8 17.9 98.1 19.0 124.5 17.9 60.0 34.3 91.5 33.4 186.0 44.3 
Depreciation 76.0 17.3 104.7 18.3 131.1 17.4 66.7 33.0 100.5 33.3 214.8 42.6 
Total C. Cost 143.8 35.2 202.8 37.2 255.6 35.3 126.7 67.3 192.0 66.7 400.8 86.9 




CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS 
 
5.1 Economic performance indicators 
 
 
The key economic performance indicators of the vessels, adapted from Duy et al 
(2015), are presented in table 21 and partially summarized in figure 6. These include Gross 
Revenue (GR), Earnings before Interest Taxes and Depreciation (EBITDA), Earnings before 
Tax (EBT), Operating Cash Flow Margin (OCFM), Operating Margin (OM) and Return on 
Capital (ROC). GR refers to the landing value, which is the product of annual catch in tons and 
price per unit of harvest in USD; EBITDA was obtained after subtracting all operating costs 
from gross revenue; while, EBT was calculated by subtracting all costs, including capital cost 
from gross revenue. The OCFM is the ratio of EBITDA to GR, OM is the ratio of EBT to GR 
and ROC is the ratio of EBT to total invested capital value. 
Table 21. Economic performance indicators of the vessels in Benguela and Namibe 
Variables 
Vessels -Benguela Vessel -Namibe 
N=14 vessels N=14 vessels 
Min. Max. Mean S.D Min. Max. Mean S.D 
Gross revenue 700.0 2295.3 1066.9 453.9 292.0 3021.6 1143.7 944.4 
    -Variable costs 205.7 1029.0 431.5 217.3 139.1 1124.1 415.6 344.0 
=Income 289.4 1266.3 635.4 283.2 119.4 1897.5 728.1 611.9 
    -Fixed costs 176.3 306.8 252.7 46.8 66.9 434.3 228.1 154.5 
=EBITDA -13.8 959.6 382.7 278.9 27.3 1463.2 500.0 480.5 
    -Depreciation 51.2 156.2 102.0 28.1 37.8 237.9 131.7 74.0 
= Operating Profit (EBIT) -129.6 803.4 280.7 262.1 -18.1 1441.4 383.7 450.8 
    -Calc. interest on loan 42.0 150.0 94.8 29.0 30.0 210.0 116.3 65.6 
Pretax Profit (EBT) -237.6 653.4 185.9 246.7 -58.3 1015.3 252.0 357.3 
Operating CF Margin  -2% 51% 34% 16% 9% 60% 39% 14% 
Operating Margin  -30% 37% 14% 18% -19% 39% 13% 17% 
Return on Capital -13% 31% 10% 12% -8% 27% 8% 11% 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel per year (2014).  
 





The results in table 21 show that 13 out of 14 vessels covered in Benguela, had positive 
EBITDA and fully recovered their operating costs, with no losses. When also considering 
capital costs, i.e. the costs of depreciation and interest, 10 out of the 14 vessels or 71% percent 
showed positive EBT (profit before interest on owner’s capital) after deducting the costs of 
depreciation and interest. Similarly, the same 10 out of 14 vessels showed positive return on 
invested capital.  
In Namibe, on the other hand, all 14 vessels covered, had positive EBITDA and fully 
recovered their operating costs, with no loss. However, when considering capital costs, 11 out 
of the 14 vessels or 70% showed a positive EBT (profit before interest on owner’s capital); and 











































Figure 8. Mean economic performance indicators of vessels in Benguela and Namibe. All figures are 
in thousand USD per vessel per year (2014). Negative signs indicate the cost items. EBITDA is the 
earnings before interest tax and depreciation, EBIT stands for earning before tax while EBT is the 
earning before tax on owner’s capital. In addition to this, resource rent would have been calculated as 
the difference between EBT and interest on owner’s capital; however, data on owner’s capital was not 
made available. Therefore, EBT is the final indicator in this study.  




The mean annual gross revenue of the two fleets as illustrated in figure 6, were nearly 
the same: 1.06 million and 1.14 million USD of landed value per vessel for Benguela and 
Namibe fleet, respectively. However, in Benguela GR ranged from 700 thousand to 2.3 million 
while it ranged from 292 thousand to 3.02 millions USD per vessel year in Namibe.  
The second indicator, EBITDA, that represents the operating cash flow margin 
(OCFM), was found to be higher in Namibe, 39% of gross revenue and, relatively lower in 
Benguela, 34%. In fact, OCFM in Benguela varied from -2% to 51% as compared to 9% to 
60% in Namibe fleet. That implies not all sampled vessels in Benguela were able to cover their 
operating costs, while all in vessels in Namibe were able to cover their operating costs for the 
fishing year 2014.  
EBT (profit before interest on owner’s capital) is considered the remaining value after 
all costs, (including annual depreciation interest on capital) have been deducted. In general, 
Benguela fleet had a slightly higher mean EBT representing 14% of gross revenue, in contrast 
to 13% in Namibe. However, in Benguela EBT ranged from -237 thousand to 653 thousand 
USD, while it ranged from -58.3 thousand to 1.01 million USD per vessel in Namibe. Four out 
of 14 vessels in Benguela had a negative EBT, ranging between -237 to -21.3 thousand USD, 
whereas, three out of 14 vessels in Namibe had a negative EBT ranging from -58.3 to -45.3 
thousand USD.  
 
           Statistical test results of economic performance indicators         
The mean values of the economic performance indicators presented in table 21 and 
figure 6 are different from an economic point of view. Such difference would support the idea 
that one fleet or vessel group had a better performance than the other. However, from a 
statistical point of view, this is not enough to make such a conclusion. The conclusion is 
therefore grounded on the T-test for two independent sample and the Confidence Interval error 
bars that indicate statistically significant differences or no significant differences in the mean 
values of indicators in Benguela and Namibe fleet i.e. EBT, operating cash flow margin 
(OCFM), operating margin (OM) and return on capital (ROI).  
The T test results, as seen on tables 1 to 4 on appendix C, show that there are no 
statistically significant differences between the mean values of economic performance 
indicators of Benguela and Namibe fleets. The probability value for the four comparisons are 




The hypothesis test is further supported by the 95% confidence interval error bars 





Figure 9a. Comparison of mean EBT (profit before 
opportunity cost on owner’s capital) between the fleets 
in Benguela and Namibe.  
 Figure 9b. Comparison of mean operating cash 





Figure 9c. Comparison of mean OM between the fleets 
in Benguela and Namibe. 
 Figure 9d. Comparison of mean return on invested 
capital between the fleets in Benguela and Namibe. 
 
Figure 9. 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) error bars showing variations in the mean values of the 
economic performance indicators (EBT, NCFM, OM and ROI).The overlap rule for 95% CI error bars 
(n≥10) states that: if error bars overlap by half the average arm length, p≈ 0.05. And, if the tips of the 
error bars just touch, p≈ 0.01 (Cumming et al, 2007). The error bars on the figures do overlap, reflecting 
a p value higher than alpha (0.05), thus no statistically significant difference between the means values 













































 Table 22. Economic performance indicators among vessel groups in Benguela and Namibe. 
Variables 
Vessel groups -Benguela Vessel groups -Namibe 
100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700	   100< HP≤400  400 <HP≤700 HP>700	  
(N=5) (N=5) (N=4) (N=4) (N=5) (N=5) 
 Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Mea
n S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Gross revenue 835.0 169.1 1111.6 417.7 1301. 675.3 448.9 128.6 663.3 313.0 2179.8 821.6 
Variable costs 342.3 106.3 404.2 182.4 577.2 319.9 182.7 42.4 228.9 69.3 788.6 326.7 
Income 492.7 136.5 707.4 263.6 723.8 420.9 266.2 94.4 434.4 256.3 1391.2 523.1 
Fixed costs 238.7 56.9 232.1 31.6 296.0 17.0 107.6 37.8 128.9 36.2 423.8 23.2 
EBITDA 254.0 145.3 475.4 254.2 427.7 422.2 158.6 90.7 305.5 232.4 967.5 503.1 
Depreciation 76.0 17.3 104.7 18.3 131.1 17.4 66.7 33.0 100.5 33.3 214.8 42.6 
EBIT 178.1 138.2 370.6 238.6 296.7 406.0 92.0 70.4 204.9 209.0 795.9 525.2 
Calc. interest   67.8 17.9 98.1 19.0 124.5 17.9 60.0 34.3 91.5 33.4 186.0 44.3 
EBT 110.3 132.8 272.5 223.1 172.2 389.4 32.0 62.1 113.4 189.1 566.7 424.3 
OCF Margin 30% 16% 42% 9% 28% 23% 34% 13% 41% 19% 41% 12% 
OM 13% 16% 22% 10% 6% 28% 7% 15% 10% 21% 21% 16% 
ROC 9% 12% 15% 10% 6% 17% 4% 7% 5% 11% 15% 11% 
Unit: Thousand USD per vessel per year (2014).  
Source: own data and calculations. 
 
 
Results in table 22 show remarkable differences in the values of economic performance 
indicators among vessel groups in both fishing towns (fleets).  
Within the Benguela fleet, the mean gross revenue increased with increasing engine 
power such that vessel group 100 <HP≤400 generated the lowest mean revenue whereas, those 
with HP>700 generated the highest. All other performance indicators such as EBITDA, EBT, 
OCFM and ROC where higher in 400 <HP≤700 and lower in 100 <HP≤400.   
Within the Namibe fleet, all performance indicators including gross revenue increased 
with increasing engine power. That implies, vessel group 100 <HP≤400 generated the lowest 





Comparisons of economic performance among vessel groups are further illustrated in 





Figure 10. Economic performance indicators 
among vessel groups within the Benguela 
fleet. Along the x-axis are the HP vessel. Each 
bar represents the percentage of an EPI 
namely OCMF; OM; and ROC  
Source: collected data and authors figure.  
 
 Figure 11. Economic performance indicators 
among vessel groups within the Namibe fleet. 
Along the x-axis are the HP vessel. Each bar 
represents the percentage of an EPI namely 
OCMF; OM; and ROC  
Source: collected data and authors figure.  
 
 
In Benguela, engine vessel group 400 <HP≤700 achieved the best financial and 
economic results, with OCFM at 42%, OM at 22% and ROC at 15%; followed by engine vessel 
group 100<HP≤400, with an OCFM at 30%, OM at 13% and ROC at 9%. Vessel group 
HP>700, had a relatively lower OCFM, 28%, in fact, this group had the poorest performance, 
since OM and ROC were found to be 6% each. 
 In contrary, within the Namibe fleet, engine vessel group HP>700 achieved the best 
financial and economic results, with OCFM at 41%, OM at 21% and ROC at 15%; followed 
by vessel group 400<HP≤700 with an OCFM at 41%, OM at 10% and ROC at 5%. Vessel 
group 100 <HP≤400, had a relatively lower OCFM, 34%, then, this group had the poorest 























































            Statistical tests of the EPI among vessel groups 
To support the above conclusions on comparison, 95% CI error bars displaying 
variation in mean values of indicators (EBT, OM and ROC) are illustrated in figures below.   
  
   Figure 12a. Earning before tax. Benguela fleet  Figure 12b. Earning before tax. Namibe fleet 
  
  Figure 12c. Operating margin. Benguela fleet  Figure 12d. Operating margin. Namibe fleet 
  
Figure 12e. Return on capital. Benguela fleet    Figure 12f. Return on capital. Namibe fleet 
Figure 12. 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) error bars showing variations in the mean values of economic 
performance indicators (EBT, OM and ROI) among vessel groups in Benguela and Namibe. All error 
bars within the Benguela fleet overlap, reflecting p values ≥ 0.05, while EBT and OM error bars of 
some vessel groups within the Namibe fleet do not overlap, reflecting p values ≈ 0.01. Thus there are 
no statistically significant differences in the mean values of economic performance indicators among 
vessel groups in Benguela, while the mean values of economic performance indicators for some vessel 

































































5.2 Cost efficiency of the vessels  
The basis for calculating cost efficiency was the cost and revenue per unit of effort. 
Fishing effort is measured as a product of HP and fishing trip per vessel for the year 2014.  
Then, the average cost tells how many USD one HP in a fishing trip, on average costs, whereas 
average revenue tells how many USD is generated per unit of HP in a fishing trip. The 
efficiency ratio (cost: revenue) therefore measures the firm’s ability to turn resources into 
revenue. It shows essentially how much was spent to generate a dollar of revenue. The lower 
the ratio, the better the efficiency. These relationships are summarized in figures 13 and 14 
below.  	  
 
Figure 13. Cost efficiency in terms of cost and revenue per unit effort among for all 
14 purse-seiners in Benguela, each bar represents a fishing vesselarranged in horse 
power groups, from the least to the most powerful group. Along the y-axis is average 
cost and average revenue in USD. Source: own data and generated figure.  
 
Figure 14. Cost efficiency in terms of cost and revenue per unit effort among for all 14 
purse-seiners in Namibe, each bar represents a fishing vessel. On the x-axis are vessels 
ID no.1 to no. 14, arranged in horse power groups, from the least to the most powerful 
group. Along the y-axis is average cost and average revenue in USD. Source: own data 



























































On average, vessels in Benguela, as illustrated in figures 13 and 14 operated at higher 
cost and generated higher revenue per unit effort than those in Namibe. The average cost and 
average revenue per unit of effort in Benguela fleet was that of 16.5 USD and 25.76 USD, 
respectively. Whereas, in Namibe fleet, average cost and average revenue per unit effort was 
8.43 USD and 14.26 USD respectively. This would imply that, fishing at one horse power per 
fishing trip, in Namibe would cost 49% less than in Benguela. However, applying the 
efficiency ratio (cost/revenue), the fleet in Benguela operated with an efficiency of 0.64; and 
the Namibe operated at 0.59. That means 0.64 USD and 0.59 USD were spent to for every 
dollar earned in revenue in Benguela and Namibe, respectively. Showing higher cost efficiency 
in Namibe fleet.  
         Among vessel groups in Benguela, those with HP>700, operated with the lowest 
cost per unit effort, an average of 14.72 USD, and generated the lowest revenue per unit effort, 
an average of 21.51 USD, corresponding to a cost efficiency of 0.68; vessel group 100 
<HP≤400, operated at the highest cost per unit effort, an average of 18.05 USD, generating an 
average of 26.25 USD, corresponding to a cost efficiency of 0.69 ; while, those within 400 
<HP≤700, generated the the highest revenue per unit effort, 28.68 USD, with an average cost 
of 16.46 USD, corresponding to a cost efficiency of 0.57. Thus, vessels within 400 <HP≤700 
group were the most cost-efficient (0.57 dollars spent to generate 1.00 of revenue) while those 
in the group 100 <HP≤400 were the least cost efficient (0.69 dollars spent to generate 1.00 of 
revenue) in Benguela fleet.  
          Within the Namibe fleet, results in figure 11 show that vessel group 
400<HP≤700, operated at the lowest cost, 5.28 USD and, generated the lowest revenue per unit 
effort, of 9.19 USD, corresponding to a cost efficiency of 0.57, while those within HP>700 
operated at the highest cost: 12.94 USD, and generated the highest revenue, 22.52 USD per 
unit effort, corresponding to a cost efficiency ratio of 0.57. vessel group within 100 <HP≤400), 
operated at a cost of 6.74 USD and generated a revenue of 10.28 USD per unit effort, 
corresponding a cost efficiency ratio of 0.66. Thus, vessels within the group 400<HP≤700 and 
HP>700 were the most cost efficient with rations of 0.57 each while, 100<HP≤400 vessels 








            Statistical test results of cost efficiency   
 
The mean values of cost efficiency indicators (cost per unit effort, revenue per unit 
effort and cost revenue ratio) presented in figures 13 and 14 are different from an economic 
point of view.  
Statistical results derived from a T-test, for independent samples, show that there are 
statistically significant differences between the mean values of cost per unit effort; revenue per 
unit effort of the two fleets. The probability value for the two comparisons are smaller than 
0.05: Cost per unit effort (p=0.00005) while, revenue per unit effort (p=0.001). However, there 
is no statistically significant difference between the mea cost revenue ratios (p=0.33). See 
tables 5 and 6 on appendix C.  
The hypothesis test is further supported by confidence interval error bars illustrated in 




Figure 15. 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) error 
bars showing variation in the mean values of cost 
per unit effort. The error bars on the figure do not 
overlap, reflecting a p value lower than alpha 
(p<0.05). Meaning that there is statistically 
significant difference between the mean values of 
cost per unit effort between the fleets in Benguela 
and Namibe. The cost is in USD, while effort is 
expressed as the product of HP and fishing trips. 
Figure 16. 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) error 
bars showing variation in the mean values of 
revenue per unit effort. The error bars on the 
figure do not overlap, reflecting a p value lower 
than alpha (p<0.05). Meaning that there is 
statistically significant difference between the 
mean values of revenue per unit of effort 
between the fleets in Benguela and Namibe. 
The revenue is in USD, while effort is 































Statistical differences in cost and revenue per unit effort among vessel groups are also 




Figure 17a. Comparison of the mean values of cost 
per unit of effort among the three vessel groups 
within the Benguela fleet.	  	  
   Figure 17b. Comparison of the mean values of 
cost per unit of effort among the three vessel 




Figure 17c. Comparison of the mean values of 
revenue per unit of effort among the three vessel 
groups within the Benguela fleet.  
   Figure 17d. Comparison of the mean values of 
revenue per unit of effort among the three vessel 
groups within the Benguela fleet.  
  
 Figure 17. 95% Confidence Intervals error bars showing variations in the mean values of cost 
and revenue per unit effort among vessel groups within Benguela and Namibe fleet. All CI 
error bars (figure 17a and 17c) within Benguela fleet overlap, reflecting p values higher than 
alpha (p>0.05), thus no statistically significant differences in the mean values of AC and AR 
among vessel groups in Benguela. Whereas, not all CI error bars (figures 17c and 17d) in 
Namibe fleet overlap, reflecting some p values lower than alpha (p<0.05), then, there is 
statistically significant difference in mean values of HP>700 and the other two vessel groups 














































5.3 Cost structure of the fishing vessels 
                         
            Operating cost structure 
 
Figures 18 and 19 present a comparison of the operating cost structure of the vessels 
between the fishing towns and among vessel groups. For each vessel, the operating costs, 
divided into labor costs, running costs and vessel costs are presented.  
 
Figure 18. Operating cost structure of the 14 purse-seiners within the Benguela fleet for 
the fishing year 2014. Each horizontal bar represents the operating cost of an individual 
fishing vessel Along the x-axis are the proportions of operating cost components, namely 
labor, running and vessel costs. Along the y-axis (left) are the 14 vessels ID numbers, and 
the HP group (right) where each vessel belongs. Source: own data and figure. 
 
Figure 19. Operating cost structure of the 14 purse-seiners within the Namibe fleet for the 
fishing year 2014. Each horizontal bar represents the operating cost of an individual 
fishing vessel Along the x-axis are the proportions of operating cost components, namely 
labor, running and vessel costs. Along the y-axis (left) are the 14 vessels ID numbers, and 











































































































































As illustrated in figure 18 and 19, operating cost structures in both fleets are similar in 
the sense that, running cost was the most significant component and, labor cost the least 
component, that applies to all vessel groups. However, there differences in their proportions.  
In the Benguela fleet, on average, running costs, accounted for 47% of operating costs (ranging 
from 35 to 60%). Vessel costs, were the second highest component with an average of 27% 
(ranged from 18 to 40%), followed by labour cost representing an average of 26%. (ranging 
from 19 to 37%).  
Comparatively, in Namibe fleet, running costs accounted for an average of 54% of 
operating costs, (ranging from 38 to 63%), vessel costs 27%, (with a range of 18 to 40%), and 
labor costs 19%, (ranging from 16 to 30%). Thus, running costs were 7% higher in Namibe, 
while, labor cost was equally 7% higher in Benguela.  The major component of running costs 
was fuel, that accounted for an average of 61% in Benguela and 53% in Namibe fleet. Fuel 
consumption has also been shown to be a major contributor to the overall operating costs of 
fishing vessels, typically representing around 29% and 28% of total operating costs in Benguela 
and Namibe fleet, respectively. Within Benguela fleet, the proportions of operating cost 
components were found to vary among vessel groups, 100<HP≤400; 400 <HP≤700; and 
HP>700. On average, labor cost, accounted for a proportion of 26%, 30% and 23%, in 
respective order from least to most powerful engine group; running costs accounted for 
averages of 46%, 44% and 48%, while the proportion of vessel cost were 27, 26 and 28% for 
the three vessel groups.  Thus, vessel group HP>700 operated at lower labor cost (23%), and 
higher running and vessel costs (48 and 28%) within the Benguela fleet. Within the Namibe 
fleet, proportions of operating cost components were found to vary among the three vessel 
groups, 100<HP≤400T; 400<HP≤700 and HP>700.  
On average, labor cost accounted for proportions of 19, 20 and 18%, in respective order 
(from the least to the most powerful vessel engine), running costs accounted for proportions of 
54, 53 and 57%, on average, while vessel cost proportions were 27, 27 and 24% for the three 
groups. These results indicate that vessel group HP>700 operated with the lowest labor cost 
(18%), and vessel cost (24%), but with the highest running cost (57%). While 400 <HP≤700 
group operated with the highest labor cost and vessel cost (20% and 27%), but with the lowest 
running cost (53%). 2 
 
                                                   
2  With regard to the definition of the various cost components, the study follows basically the  




The mean values of operating cost components (labor, running and vessel cost) 
presented in figures 18 and 19 are different from an economic point of view. However, from a 
statistical point of view, this is not the case for all components.  
Statistical results derived from T-test, for independent samples (see table 9 to 11 on 
appendix C) show that there are statistically significant differences between the mean values 
of labour cost in Benguela and Namibe fleet (p=0.01); there are no statistically significant 
differences in mean values of running costs (p=0.8), and there are no statistically significant 
differences in men values of vessel cost (p=0.4). The hypothesis test is further supported by 




Figure 20a. Comparison of the mean values of 
labour cost between the fleets in Benguela and 
Namibe.  
 Figure 20b. Comparison of the mean values of 





Figure 20c. Comparison of the mean values of 
vessel cost between the fleets in Benguela and 
Namibe. 
 Figure 20d. Comparison of the mean values of total 
operating costs between the fleets in Benguela and 
Namibe. 
 
Figure 20. 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) error bars showing variations in the mean values of operating 
(labor cost, running cost and vessel cost) between Benguela and Namibe fleet. With the exception of 
labor cost (figure 20a), error bars overlap, reflecting p values higher than alpha (p>0.05). Meaning that 
there is statistically significant difference between the mean values of labor cost (figure 20a), while, 
there is no statistically significant difference between the mean values of running costs (figure 20b), 






































































The mean values of operating costs were compared among vessel groups within the two fleets, 




Figures 21a. Comparison of the mean values of 
labour costs among the three vessel groups within 
the Benguela fleet. The values are in thousand 
USD per vessel year.  
 
 Figures 21b. Comparison of the mean values of 
labour costs among the three vessel groups within 
the Namibe fleet. The values are in thousand USD 





Figures 21c. Comparison of the mean values of 
total operating costs among the three vessel groups 
within the Benguela fleet. The values are in 
thousand USD per vessel year.  
 
 Figures 21d. Comparison of the mean values of 
total operating costs among the three vessel 
groups within the Namibe fleet. The values are 
thousand USD per vessel year.  
 
  
Figure 21. 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) error bars showing the variation of the mean values 
of labour costs and total operating cost among vessel groups. All CI error bars within the 
Benguela fleet (figure 21c) do overlap, reflecting a p value higher than alpha (p>0.05). Then, 
there is no statistically significant difference in mean values of operating costs among vessel 
groups in Benguela; On the other hand, not all CI error bars within the Namibe fleet (figure 
21d) overlap. Reflecting a p value lower than alpha (p<0.05). Then, there is statistically 
significant differences in mean values of operating costs among vessel groups HP>700, and 





































































           Total cost structure 
 
Total fishing costs in this study is referred to the sum of operating costs and capital 
costs. Capital costs is the calculated depreciation and calculated interest on capital value. 
Usually capital cost accounts for a lower proportion of total cost than operating cost does. This 





Figure 1. Total cost structure of the 14 purse-seiners 
within the Benguela fleet in 2014. 
Each horizontal bar represents the total cost of an 
individual fishing vessel. Along the x-axis are the 
proportions of total cost components, namely 
operating, and capital costs. Along the y-axis (left) are 
the 14 vessels ID numbers and the HP group (right 
where each vessel belongs. Each bar represents a 
fishing vessel.  
Source: collected data and authors figure.  
 
 Figure 2. Total cost structure of the 14 purse-seiners 
within the Namibe fleet in 2014. 
Each horizontal bar represents the total cost of an 
individual fishing vessel. Along the x-axis are the 
proportions of total cost components, namely 
operating, and capital costs. Along the y-axis (left) are 
the 14 vessels ID numbers and the HP group (right 
where each vessel belongs. Each bar represents a 
fishing vessel.  
Source: collected data and authors figure.  
 
 
On average, operating costs accounted for 77% while, capital cost accounted for an 
average, of 23% of total fishing cost within the Benguela fleet. In contrast, within the Namibe 
fleet, the same components accounted for averages of 70 and 30% respectively. Among vessel 
groups, it is interesting to note that the highest share of capital cost, 28%, in Benguela was 
among HP>700), followed by 400 <HP≤700 (23%), and 100 <HP≤400 (19%) vessel groups. 
In Namibe, in contrary, the highest share of capital costs, 34% was that of smaller engine 
vessels 100 <HP≤400, followed by larger engine vessels HP>700 (31%) and finally 100 





































































































5.4 Fuel and eco-efficiency  
 
Fuel efficiency, in this study is considered as the amount of diesel fuel required to land 
one tone of wet weight fish; while eco-efficiency (carbon footprint) is presented as the amount 
(kg) of CO2-e as a result of burning diesel fuel on-board fishing vessels, in 2014.  Results of 
fuel efficiency in liters of fuel used to land 1 ton of fish are illustrated on the figure 25 below.   
 
Figure 3. Variation in fuel efficiency-in liters of fuel used to land 1 ton of fish, among vessel groups in 
Benguela and Namibe fleet. There are remarkable variations in fuel efficiency between the fleets and 
among vessel groups. Each bar represents a fishing vessel.  
Source: Own data and figure generated by author.  
On average, fuel efficiency in Benguela fleet was 184 L/ton (range 77 to 318 L/ton), in 
contrast to 110 L/ton (range 37 to 217 L/ton) in Namibe fleet. (This indicates that Namibe fleet 
was more fuel efficient in terms of catch than that of Benguela.  
Fuel efficiency also varied among vessel groups in both fleets. On a respective order 
from vessel group 100 <HP≤400; 400 <HP≤700 to HP>700, the average fuel efficiency in 
Benguela fleet was 195, 146 and 215 L/ton, whereas in Namibe it was 142, 123 and 71 L/ton, 
respectively. Thus, vessel group HP>700 in Namibe was the most fuel efficient (71 L/ton), and 
the same group, HP>700 in Benguela was the least efficient (215 L/Ton).  
 



























           Statistical test results 
Statistical test results derived from a T-test, for independent samples (see table 8 in 
appendix C), show that there are statistically significant differences in mean values of fuel 
efficiency between the fleets in Benguela and Namibe (p=0.005). Confidence interval error 
bars illustrated in figures 26 below further tested the hypothesis test.  
 
Figure 4. Confidence Intervals (CI) error bars showing difference in the mean fuel efficiency (liters 
of fuel per tons of fish landed). The error bars on the figures do not overlap, reflecting a p value 







Fig. 26a  Fig. 26b 
Figure 5. 95% Confidence Intervals error bars showing the variation of the mean fuel consumption (L) 
per ton of fish landed (tons) among vessel groups in Benguela (n=14) and Namibe (n=14). All CI error 
bars within Benguela fleet overlap, reflecting p values higher than alpha (p>0.05). While, not all CI error 
bars in Namibe fleet overlap, reflecting some p value lower than alpha (p<0.05). Then the means are not 
statistically significant different in Benguela fleet, while, the mean values of vessel group 100 <HP≤400 





























            Eco-efficiency  
Burning a liter of diesel fuel on-board fishing vessels results in the emission of 
approximately 2.8 kg CO2-e per liter consumed (GHG-to-fuel ratio) (Seafish, 2009). Relating 
this to fuel efficiency, figure 25, or liters of fuel consumed per ton of wet landings, results on 
eco-efficiency in terms of carbon footprint per ton of fish landed is presented below.  
 
Figure 6. Eco-efficiency-in terms of kg of carbon emitted per ton of fish landings in both fishing towns 
fleet (Benguela and Namibe) and, among vessel. There are remarkable variations in carbon footprint 
between fleets and among vessel groups. Each bar represents a fishing vessel, and each color represents 
a vessel group.  
Source: own data and figure generated by author.  
In principle, results on figure 27 (eco-efficiency) follow the same trend as that of figure 
24 (fuel efficiency). If burning a liter of fuel results in approximately 2.8 kg CO2-emission, 
then, the carbon footprint per ton of fish landed is the product of fuel efficiency (L/tons) and 
CO2 emission rate (2.8kg). In other words, the fuel use intensity (FUI), or liters of fuel 
consumed per ton of wet weight landings (L/t) is the) is a relatively reliable indicator of the 
carbon footprint of landed, unprocessed fish. When applied to this fleet, these results in an 
average direct fuel-related GHG value of 514 kg CO2-e per ton of fish landed by Benguela 
fleet in contrast to 307 kg CO2-e per ton of fish landed by Namibe fleet. This indicates that 
Namibe fleet was more eco-efficient in terms of CO2-e released per unit of catch landed than 
that of Benguela. In other words, an average purse seiner in Benguela released 207 kg CO2 

























Of course, this varied by fishing towns and vessel groups in accordance with variation 
in fuel use intensity e.g., the average fuel-related GHG emissions per ton of fish landed, among 
100 <HP≤400; 400 <HP≤700 and HP>700 groups were, 547 kg, 410 kg, and 602 kg CO2-e 
respectively within the Benguela fleet and, 399 kg, 343 kg and 198 kg CO2-e in Namibe with 
the same respective order. Therefore, vessel group 400 <HP≤700 was the most eco-efficient 
(410kg CO2/ton fish) while HP>700 group was the least efficient (602kg) in Benguela fleet. 
Within Namibe fleet, HP>700 group was the most eco-efficient (198kg), while 100 <HP≤400 
the least eco-efficient (399kg).  
Statistical test results derived from a T-test, for independent samples (see table 8 in 
appendix C), show the same output as fuel efficiency. That is, there are statistically significant 
differences between the mean values of eco-efficiency in Benguela and Namibe fleet 
(p=0.005).  
 
5.5 Effects of harvest tax and fuel subsidies on profitability 
 
This section simply provides an overview on how government policies on harvest quota 
tax and fuel support cost (subsidies) may have affected the industry net revenue, of the fleets 
in Benguela and Namibe fishing towns. The harvest quota tax is usually paid by the industry 
to the state, in proportion to the allocated quota quantity, in USD per ton (see section 2.3). Fuel 
cost support (until 2015) was by means of subsidizing the price of diesel fuel in fishing vessels 
by a few cents per liter (around USD 0.02 per liter of diesel).   
Within the Benguela fleet, harvest quota tax varied from 15 thousand to 88 thousand 
USD, corresponding to a quota quantity of 1000 and 4000 tons, respectively. Therefore, an 
average harvest tax of 35.6 thousand USD (SD=19.9 thousand) was paid per vessel in the 
fishing year 2014.  Recalling from section 5.1, the mean EBT (profit before opportunity cost 
on owner’s capital) was 185.9 thousand USD (SD=246.7 thousand). Therefore, the harvest tax 
corresponds to an average of 19% of the EBT. Meaning that on average operators had to pay 
an equivalent to 19% of their profit to the state as harvest tax, as illustrated in figure 29. 
In contrast to Namibe fleet, harvest quota tax varied from 12 thousand to 528 thousand 
USD, corresponding to a quota quantity of 800 to 24000 tons respectively. Then, on average, 
a vessel paid a harvest tax of 98.5 thousand (SD=141.8 thousand); In relation to the mean EBT 
generated by this fleet, 283.4 thousand USD (SD=397.6 thousand), harvest quota tax 







Figure 7. Proportion of mean harvest quota tax to 
mean EBT (earning before opportunity cost on 
owner’s capital) in the Benguela fleet. 
Source: own data and figure. 
 
 
Figure 29. Proportion of mean harvest quota tax to 
mean EBT (earning before opportunity cost on 
owner’s capital) in the Namibe fleet. 
Source: own data and figure.  
 
 
Source: own data and figure. 
 
The annual government support on fuel subsidy ranged from 2.4 thousand to 14.4 
thousand per vessel in the Benguela fleet. Then, on average 5.5 thousand USD, equivalent to 
2.67% of fuel cost were subsidized per vessel in Benguela. In relation to the mean profit (EBT) 
per vessel, 185.9 thousand USD, fuel subsidy accounted for 3%, (figure 31).   
In contrast, within the Namibe fleet fuel subsidy ranged from 1.6 thousand to 7.2 
thousand USD. Thus, an average of 3.9 thousand USD per vessel, equivalent to 2.67% of fuel 
cost were subsidized per vessel in Namibe. In relation to the mean, profit (EBT (per vessel, 
283, 4 thousand USD, fuel subsidy accounted for 1.4% as illustrated in figure 32. In relation to 
total operating costs, it covered on average 0.8% (range=0.4 to 1.1%) of the vessels operating 




Figure 8. Proportion of mean fuel subsidy to 
mean EBT (earnings before opportunity cost on 
owner’s capital) in the Benguela fleet. 
Source: own data and figure. 
 Figure 9. Proportion of mean fuel subsidy to 
mean EBT (earnings before opportunity on 
owner’s capital) in the Namibe fleet. 



















CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Economic performance indicators 
 
This section discusses the output indicators presented in section 5.1, namely EBITDA 
(earnings before interest tax and depreciation), EBT (profit before opportunity cost on owner’s 
capital), OM (operating margins) and ROC (return on capital). The input indicators, i.e. 
operating costs are discussed in section 6.2 and 6.3.  
On average, all vessels in both fleets had positive output indicators. The gross annual 
vessel revenue was slightly different between the two fishing towns fleet. In Benguela, the 
mean was 1066.09 thousand (SD=453.9 thousand), while in the Namibe fleet the mean gross 
revenue was that of 1143.7 thousand USD (SD=944.4 thousand) USD per vessel year. 
Differences in gross revenue are due to differences in landing volumes and the market price 
per kilo of fish, recalling equation 2 in chapter 3: TR(E)=H*p, where TR(E) is the gross 
revenue as a function of effort, H is the harvest and p the price per unit of catch. Table 9 and 
10 show differences in the mean wet weight landings between the fleets and HP groups. The 
Benguela fleet landed an average of 1524 tons per vessel (SD=648 tons), in contrast to 2718 
tons per vessel (SD=2714 tons) landed by the Namibe fleet. However, vessel operators in 
Benguela sold their catch at a relatively higher price per kilo than those in Namibe. Differences 
in price per kilo of fish may be explained by the supply demand relationships, and differences 
between the socioeconomic structures of the fishing towns. On his work, Flaaten (2016), stated 
that vessel earnings arise from the sale of fish brought to port, the price for which may be fixed 
under contract or vary subject to the laws of supply and demand. Earnings are greatly 
dependent on both quantity and individual value of the fish unloaded, differing widely from 
fishery to fishery. Moreover, that the price of fish from a particular stock is hardly affected by 
quantity fished if the fish is sold in a competitive market with many sellers and buyers and in 
competition with similar types of fish from other stocks. From table 2, we notice that Benguela 
is more densely populated, and has a wider economic structure than Namibe. Then, the demand 
and price of fish tend to be higher in Benguela.  
Landing values (GR) as indicated in table 22 under results, show an increasing trend 
with increasing engine size in both fleets, in other words, 100 <HP≤400 had lower landing 
values than HP>700 group. This can be explained by the fact that smaller engine vessels have 
lower fishing power and less holding capacity than larger engine vessels.  
It is important to highlight that most capital costs in this study are imputed which can 
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depress the apparent operating and pre-tax profit in certain cases. Therefore, an important 
indicator to consider in this analysis is the EBITDA, referred to as a good short-term indicator 
in fisheries (Flaaten, 2016). Positive EBITDA means that the vessel owners are able to pay for 
all their operating costs and meeting at least part of their obligations to creditors (Duy et al, 
2015). Further, Duy et al, (2015), argued that, EBITDA mainly reflects the cash a fishing firm 
has earned from its fishing operations, and that positive EBITDA indicates that the gross 
revenue exceeds the vessel owner's operational and labour costs and that there may exist IMR 
in the short term for the owners.  
A reasonable hypothesis here is that most vessel owners in both fishing fleets had 
positive EBITDA, with annual means of 328.7 thousand (SD=278 thousand) and 500 thousand 
USD (SD=480 thousand) in Benguela and Namibe fleet respectively. In contrary to gross 
revenue, EBITDA was notably higher within the Namibe fleet, this was mainly due to lower 
operating costs, particularly labour and fuel cost as compared to Benguela fleet, taking into 
account the fact that EBITDA is obtained by subtracting operating costs from gross revenue. 
Variations in EBITDA found among vessel groups table 22, reflects the influence of technical 
and operational characteristics on vessel earning, in other words, input-output relationship 
(CEMARE, 2003), such that larger engine vessels, with higher capital inputs and higher fishing 
effort, incur higher operating costs than smaller vessels, however, vessels with higher capital 
input tend to have higher fishing efficiency (Lim et al, 2012). Table 21 indicates that not all 
vessels within Benguela fleet were not able to cover their operating costs (EBITDA value is -
13.8 thousand USD). Surprisingly it is the youngest vessel in the fleet (acquired in 2013). This 
economic inefficiency may be explained by the vessels smaller landing quantity for the fishing 
year that was reportedly below average (1130 tons). In fact, it is a vessel within the HP>700 
engine group whose operating and capital costs were very high.  
Upon deducting imputed capital from EBITDA, the resultant mean positive profit 
(EBT, profit before the opportunity cost of owner’s capital) in both fleets implies that, on 
average both fleets were economically efficient and profitable. However, 28% of the vessels 
in Benguela, and 21% in Namibe fleet had negative profit, in other words operated at a loss. 
Operators argued that these losses are attributed to a variety of factors, of which the low market 
price of sardinellas (the major species in terms of volume), and increasing operating costs, 
particularly fuel and vessel maintenance are the main factors. If this loss persists in the 




The OCFM (ratio of EBITDA to gross revenue), and the OM (ratio of EBT to gross 
revenue), are two important indicators in this study. The former expresses what is left as 
compensation to capital in relation to gross revenue and, the latter expresses the percentage of 
earnings left after all costs. The average OCFM was 34 and 39% for Benguela and Namibe 
while the average OM was 14 and 13%, respectively. This implies, all vessels in both fleets 
managed their operating costs and capital costs quiet well.  In effect, operating margin 
measures how much out of every dollar of sales a company actually keeps in earnings. A 14% 
OM, then, means that vessels in Benguela had an average net income of USD 0.14 for each 
dollar, while those in Namibe fleet had a net income of USD 0.13 for each dollar of total 
revenue earned. The mean rates of return on invested capital of 10% and 8% for vessels in 
Benguela and Namibe, respectively, show that invested capital was more effectively used by 
vessels in Benguela than in Namibe fleet. Partly because of higher invested capital value in 
Namibe than Benguela and because of differences in cost structure between the vessels as 
discussed in section 6.3. On an economic performance study, FAO (2001) stated that a profit 
margin and ROC above 10% is considered ok. Based on this, we can conclude on average 
vessels in both fleets covered their opportunity cost of capital. However, ROC on the Namibe 
fleet was relatively of poor performance (8%).  
Overall, vessels with engine 400 <HP≤700 had better economic performance indicators 
than the other groups in Benguela, while in Namibe those within HP>700 had the best 
performance. In case of low performance in large engine vessels, one may partly consider 
overinvestment on the particular vessel (Coglan and Pascoe, 1997). That may be the case of 
vessel no 13 within the Benguela fleet (see table 1B in appendix). Higher performance of large 
engine vessels (HP>700), on the other hand, can be explained by the fact that they often 
generate higher revenue than smaller ones due to high fishing power and efficiency (Lim et al, 
2012). On their research, Long et al, (2008), stated that in most fisheries larger engine vessels 
are able to search for large schools of fish and catch with less effort than smaller ones. For 
instance, larger vessels (HP>700) in Namibe operate with bigger purse seine nets, up to 400 
meters long and 45 m deep, and are well equipped with fish finding equipment, so, may fish at 
lower cost per unit effort. In contrary, smaller vessels (100 <HP≤400) are restricted to go 
further offshore (article 12, Fisheries Law), and cannot stay longer at sea. Furthermore, this 
may also be potentially explained by differences in vessel management, e.g., some skippers 
may have been more experiment than others may, as well as differences in crew skills (although 
data on this was not available).  
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As presented on the previous chapter, some vessels earned negative economic profits 
after subtracting capital costs, but the average vessel's economic profit is positive. Differences 
in profitability (EBT) among vessels can be explained by fisheries economic theory under the 
concept of intra-marginal rent, which exists due to the different cost structure of heterogeneous 
vessels (Flaaten, 2016). Vessels making economic losses after capital costs, may, however, 
operate in the short term if their marginal revenue of effort is more than the minimum average 
variable cost of effort but, in the long term, they will be forced to exit the fishery. This is further 
discussed on section 6.2. 
It should be noted that there are other costs e.g. administrative costs that were not 
included in this analysis. Meaning that for some vessels, the final economic performance output 
(EBT) should be lower than the calculated. And that there is an assumption that all catch is 
sold within a given period. However, in reality the market for low graded fish (e.g. sardinella) 
is not stable. Often, operators have additional costs for preserving unsold fish in freezers.  
 
6.2 Cost efficiency  
 
This section discusses results from section 5.2. The cost efficiency of the vessels in 
relation to cost of harvest and potential revenue.  
Overall, cost efficiency, expressed as a ratio of cost per unit and effort, and revenue per 
unit effort was higher in Benguela (USD 0.64) than Namibe fleet (USD 0.59). In this context, 
the lower the efficiency ratio, the better the performance. That means, 0.64 and 0.59 USD were 
spent for every dollar earned in revenue. Higher operating costs in Benguela, fleet was mainly 
driven by the higher fuel consumption per unit of catch and, higher labor costs, in addition to 
lower landing volumes of horse mackerel. Such higher costs have been offset to some extent 
by increasing fish prices, however some vessel owners still have to consider tying up for part 
of the year. Better cost efficiency in Namibe fleet, may have been as a result of lower labor 
costs and easier access to fishing grounds. Another possible explanation is the difference in 
catch per trip indicated on table 9. The mean catch per trip by vessels in Benguela was 20 tons 
(SD=15), in contrast to 27 tons (SD=29) in Namibe fleet.  
The greatest apparent cost efficient vessel group in terms of cost revenue ratio is that 
of 400 <HP≤700, that operated at a cost of 0.57 USD to generate a dollar of revenue, in 
Benguela. The same trend was observed within Namibe fleet, such that vessel group   
400 <HP≤700 operated with the best cost efficiency of 0.57 USD, while those in the group 100 
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<HP≤400 were the least cost efficient. The absolute differences in mean cost and revenue per 
unit effort is attributed to a variety of factors.  Smaller purse seiners (usually 100 <HP≤400) 
fish closer to the shore (beyond 2nm), while bigger seiners fish beyond 4nm. That reflects 
different distances from the harbours to the fishing grounds, hence, differences in time spent 
sailing and fishing. It is noted in table 10 that larger vessels performed less fishing trips than 
smaller ones. On his work, Flaaten (2016) stated that if a skipper decides on increasing the 
sailing speed that will mean less sailing time and more fishing time. However, fuel 
consumption increases with increasing speed and that implies increasing marginal costs in 
response to increasing effort.     
In fact, large engine vessels (HP>700) had higher operating costs due to higher absolute 
amounts inputs than smaller ones. Fishing trips were actually longer, nets are larger nets, thus 
higher fuel consumption. Additionally, larger vessels incur high depreciation and interest 
payment on loans due to higher investments. Fuel costs are usually based on the engine size of 
the vessels. It implies that bigger vessels are technically expected to have higher fuel costs 
(Lim et al, 2012). Furthermore, majority of lager vessels have modern equipment that enable 
them to fish with high efficiency.  
In general, for a particular fishery, vessel type and base of operation, a particular size 
range of craft will offer maximum returns, Boncoeur et al (2000). However, as size increases 
above the optimum, both capital and operating costs tend to increase ever more rapidly than 
catches (earnings), so that too large a vessel will lose money (Flaaten, 2016). Variations in cost 
efficiency among vessels is additionally explained by variations in technical and operational 
characteristics illustrated on table 9 and 10 in chapter 4. On their study, Thanh et al, (2008), 
pointed out that homogenous vessels on the other hand, are from a cost point of view, equally 
equipped and crewed and the marginal and the average cost of effort are the same for all 
vessels. This relates to a few vessels within the groups 400 <HP≤700 in Namibe fleet, that are 
of the same size and equally equipped. However, average revenue; hence cost efficiency varied 
within these homogeneous vessels due to differences in operational aspects.  
The most cost- efficient vessels such as those in the groups 400 <HP≤700 and HP>700 
in Benguela and Namibe respectively, might have made above-normal profit, called intra-
marginal rent. This according to Flaaten, (2016), may have some implications for management. 
For instance, if the fishery manager wants to reduce effort to EMEY, some vessels may lose 
their part of the intra-marginal rent. This may result in objections to change of management 
objective. However, as demonstrated in section 3.2. The total rent is highest for the EMEY 
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effort level, and some of this could be used to compensate those vessels that may be in danger 
of losing their previous intra-marginal rent. 
 
6.3 Cost structure  
 
 
This section mainly discusses differences in operating cost structure (labour, running 
and vessel costs), and to a smaller extend, capital cost structure presented on section 5.3.  
In general, operating costs vary widely depending on fishing method and gears used, 
the distance to the fishing grounds, the general cost structure of a particular country or region 
and many other factors (FAO, 2005). The mean labor costs differ statistically between the two 
fleets, with 26% (SD=5%) of total operating cost in Benguela and 19% (SD=2%) in Namibe 
(p=0.01). This difference is partly because Benguela is, from a socioeconomic point of view a 
larger city than Namibe (see table 2 in chapter 2). The city of Benguela is among the countries 
most developed province, it harbors the second largest commercial port that employs about 
3000 people; it has potential agricultural resources in contrast to Namibe that is a smaller town 
with fewer job opportunities. All these factors, in fact contribute to higher opportunity cost of 
labor in Benguela than in Namibe. For instance, according to Flaaten (2016), fishers living in 
a small coastal community far away from larger towns and cities usually have few alternative 
employment possibilities; thus, the opportunity cost of labour will be lower in such a 
community than in larger labour markets. On the other hand, other inputs required for fishing 
may be costlier in small fishing communities than in towns, due to transportation cost and less 
competition between distributors Thus, differences in efficiency of effort, market prices of 
inputs and opportunity cost of labour may all contribute to the existence of heterogeneous effort 
in the fish harvesting industry.  
Within the Benguela fleet, vessel group 400 <HP≤700 operated with highest labor cost 
while 100 <HP≤400 group operated with lowest cost. Thus, as indicated on table 9 this is 
directly related to the crew number, in other words, vessel group with the higher number of 
crew had the highest labour cost in Benguela fleet. This can be supported by the fact that larger 
vessels are more capital rather than labour intensive. The trend was different within Namibe 
fleet where labour cost increased with engine size group such that larger vessels (HP>700) 
operated with a labour cost almost three times higher than those of smaller ones (100 
<HP≤400). The major component of labor cost in larger vessels was fixed salaries to operators 
(captain and well-qualified technical staff) rather than crew wage. These are large purse seiners 
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mainly operated by foreign investors in joint venture with national fish harvesting firms. 
Concerning crew wage in most firms, (particularly smaller vessels) there is a common practice 
to manage a vessel as a form of joint enterprise between owner and crew, in such a manner that 
both share in the success, or lack thereof, of each trip. Under such an arrangement expenses 
are allocated to the owner, while earnings are allocated between owner and crew in a 
prearranged proportion, usually one to two US$ per fishermen per ton of landings, in most 
cases. On his research, Hao (2012), stated that whatever detailed accounting arrangement used 
between the owner and crew, the share is balanced so that the owner receives a reasonable 
return on his investment capital, while crew are reward for their work, so that both parties are 
encouraged to run the operations efficiently and maximize returns. 
Concerning running costs, the means of the two fleets, namely Benguela and Namibe 
were not statistically significant different (p=0.8), although they varied in terms of percentage 
of operating cost: 47% (SD=6%) and 54% (SD=5%) in Benguela and Namibe fleets 
respectively. Such differences are mainly due to fuel costs that accounted for 61 and 53% 
respectively. Characteristically smaller vessels tend to fish near the shore with smaller gears 
compared with large vessels that fish further from the shore and use larger gears (Lim, 2012). 
Hence, it would be expected that boats operating far from the shore (e.g. HP>700) would have 
higher running costs than those operating near the shore (e.g.100 <HP≤400). There was an 
apparent increase in mean total running cost from small (100 <HP≤400) to large engine vessels 
(HP>700) both in Benguela and Namibe fleet, in fact, all running costs components including 
fuel and lubricant, food and ice follow the same trend. 
    Vessel cost as the second major component of operating cost (accounting for 27%), 
as illustrated in figure 20, the means of the two fleets are not statistically significant different 
(p=0.4). The mean values for Benguela and Namibe fleets were 146 thousand US$ (SD=90) 
and, 166 thousand (SD=43 thousand) respectively. Vessel cost mainly comprised of annual 
maintenance (approximately 70%) and to a smaller extend minor repairs and insurance costs). 
Higher vessel costs, particularly maintenance in Namibe fleet is primarily because of larger 
vessels in Namibe (table 10); further, Long (2008), stated that vessels with higher fishing 
intensity or effort during a fishing year are expected to have more break downs and worn out 
equipment, requiring higher costs of repairs and maintenance.  
         The greatest apparent mean vessel costs were experience by vessel group HP>700 
in both fleets. In fact, larger engine vessels would be expected to have higher maintenance, 
repair and insurance costs than smaller ones.  
       The mean capital costs differ between the two fleets, with 23% of total cost in 
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Benguela and 30% in Namibe. This difference is partly due to the fact that Namibe fleet is 
relatively larger, with a total GRT of 3,386 tons and total engine capacity of 16,432 HP, in 
contrast to 3,406 tons and a total engine capacity of 14,001 HP in Benguela. Vessels in Namibe 
have therefore a higher mean book value and annual depreciation. The share of capital costs in 
total fishing costs seem to be directly associated with the investment capital. Table 11, shows 
that there was higher investment capital in the Namibe than Benguela fleet, particularly in large 
engine group.  
  
6.4 Fuel use and eco-efficiency 
Fuel used in fishing vessels operations is the main energy use in fisheries (FAO, 2012). 
However, the price of fuel is still a major issue for the industry.   
Several factors are known to influence the fuel intensity of commercial fisheries. These 
include the abundance and characteristics of the target species, vessel and engine size, fleet 
size and the degree of its overcapitalization, trip length and distance travelled to fishing 
grounds, and the gear used SEAFISH (2009). Based on some of this factors, there was a 
significant difference in fuel efficiency between the fleets in Benguela and Namibe (p=0.005). 
The mean fuel consumption per ton of landings in Benguela fleet was that of 184 L/ton 
(SD=74.28), in contrast to 110 L/ton (SD=53.7) in Namibe fleet. Recalling from chapter 3, 
stock density of schooling species is relatively higher off the Namibe than Benguela coast; 
tables 1B and 1C in appendix indicate that Namibe fleet had a higher CPUE, and that trips were 
relatively shorter (table 9). That may have contributed to better fuel efficiency in Namibe fleet. 
FAO (2012), reported that, vessels using seines to target near shore stocks of schooling small 
pelagic species may use well under 100 litres of diesel per metric ton landed, while trawlers 
and longliners targeting high value species have been documented to burn over 2000 litres per 
metric ton. Moreover, it was reported by FAO (2004), that purse seiners targeting herring in 
the NE Atlantic have a fuel efficiency of 100 liters per ton of fish landed. Thus, results indicate 
that Namibe fleet had a fuel efficiency close to that of NE Atlantic herring fleet. Several broad 
analyses of fuel consumption in fisheries have been undertaken in recent decades for instance 
(Tyedmers, 2004; Driscoll and Tyedmers, 2008). Results of these studies suggest that fuel use 
intensity varies greatly between fisheries targeting different species, employing different gears, 
and fishing in different regions. Generally, fisheries targeting small pelagic species and 
employing purse seine gear perform relatively well when compared to higher trophic level 
species caught with trawl or longline. 
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Variations in fuel efficiency among vessel groups as illustrated in figure 24 can also be 
explained by variations in technical and operational characteristics such as steaming speed to 
and from fishing grounds, time spent searching for fish; the quality and availability of fish-
finding equipment e.g. sonars and echosounders. Vessel engine group 400 <HP≤700 appear to 
be the most fuel efficient in Benguela (mean=146 L/ton) while those in the group HP>700 were 
the most efficient in Namibe (71L/ton). Recalling from section 5.2 these were the most cost 
efficient groups.  
According to FAO, (2012), in order to minimize fuel costs fishers examine closely the 
costs and benefits of various factors and this influences their decision-making. For example, 
when deciding whether to go fishing, a fisherman would consider the following factors: 
weather conditions, distance to the fishing grounds, duration of fishing trips, quota, quality of 
fish, and supply of fish to the market and the potential of landing to a hungry market. The cost 
of fuel in trip with bad weather will inevitably be more than in good weather. However, this 
can be offset by a good market price upon landing.  
 
            Eco-efficiency 
Commercial fisheries are heavily dependent upon the combustion of fossil fuels and as 
such contribute to increased atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases that has huge 
impact on the world’s climate (SEAFISH, 2009). Using the fishery-related fuel use intensity 
effects on greenhouse gas emissions, specifically, comparing the direct effect of the annual 
burning of diesel fuel by purse seiners in Benguela and Namibe fishing towns, the mean carbon 
footprint, measured in kilos of CO2 per liter of fuel burned during fishing operations was found 
to differ significantly (p=0.005) such that vessels in Benguela produced a mean annual of 514 
kg co2-e per ton of fish landed in contrast to 307 kg co2-e in Namibe fleet. In fishing operations, 
according to Tan and Culaba (n.d.), emissions are influenced by a link between stocks and 
fishing effort e.g. fishing gears and technology used the abundance of fish (stocks) and the 
steaming distance to fishing grounds. Burning fuel in engine (s) plays a large part in overall 
emissions. Steaming distance is important but additional CO2 emissions may be generated 
during fishing operations (i.e. whilst towing the gear through the water) or by using a generator 
or hydraulics on the vessel. An important guide to the carbon footprint of a vessel is the amount 
of fuel burnt in the engines. Thus a vessel or fleet’s GHG emission (GHG emissions associated 
with a fishery per unit of catch landed), as stated by OECD (2010), is strongly related to its 
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fuel intensity (the fuel used per unit of catch landed). 
Figure 27 also illustrates that eco-efficiency varied among vessel engine groups in both 
fleets such that, CO2 emission per ton of landed fish was lower in 400 <HP≤700 group (410kg) 
in Benguela fleet in contrast to 198kg in vessel group HP>700 within the Namibe fleet. As a 
matter of fact, this variation mirrored those of fuel use efficiency discussed earlier on this 
section, whose explanations is again attributed to some biological and technical factors within 
the fishery e.g. stock density, distance to fishing ground, time spent searching for schools of 
fish and the fishing technology used. Measuring and improving the energy use and associated 
GHG emissions from fisheries according to Weidema et al., (2008) and OECD (2010), can 
decrease operational costs to fishing vessels, help vessels reach current and future marine 
emission standards, and effectively communicate to consumers the relative environmental 
costs and benefits of choosing certain products over others.  
 
 
6.5 Effects of harvest tax and fuel cost support on profitability 
 
 
Fisheries management measures such as harvest tax and subsidies are aimed to regulate 
effort and create fishing incentives, respectively (Flaaten, 2016). 
From fisheries economic theory it is well known that, in a quota managed fishery, the 
application of harvest tax as a government regulation, leads to a controlled number of 
participant and is a way of regulating effort at the same time generating revenue. On the other 
hand, it rises fishing costs and lowers revenue of the industry. When comparing to the total 
operating costs, harvest tax accounted for minor proportions of the industry cost, 5% and 12% 
in Benguela and Namibe fleets respectively.  
However, in relation to the profit before opportunity cost on owner’s capital (EBT), 
harvest tax, as presented in section 5.5 represent higher proportions of, 19 and 35% of EBT. 
According to Flaaten (2016), this is a usual method of determining the effect of government 
actions/ (regulatory policy) on the industry, or fishing firms, it allows fisheries management 
authorities to determine whether, and to what extent, the profits are altered by such policies. 
Hao, (2012), pointed out that it is an important step on the way to evaluate such government 
policies (harvest quota tax and fuel subsidies) such that, the reaction of the industry can be 
determined. The tax authority, traditionally the central government, collects the resource rent 
generated. This tax revenue may be used to reduce other taxes or to augment the government’s 
expenditures. From a policy point of view, resource rent can be re-distributed, for example, to 
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fishing communities or regions, without any efficiency loss (Flatten 2016).  
The great variations in harvest quota quantity, hence harvest tax within the Namibe 
fleet is partly explained by variation in vessel size (table 9 in chapter 4). In fact, larger vessels 
(HP>700) firms secure higher quota quantity because they own fishmeal and oil processing 
plants onshore. Regardless of the market price of fish, they tend to catch and land larger 
quantities for reduction purpose. In Benguela, the situation is not that different, however, 
reduction takes place at a larger scale in Namibe. With regard to harvest quota quantity on 
average, vessels in Benguela were more efficient because they fished out 81% of the allocated 
quota compared to those in Namibe that only fished out 57% of their allocated quota. If costs 
are to be minimized, operators need to improve their catch efficiency. Usually, fishery manager 
determines the quota price as harvest tax of m $ per tonne. In addition, the fish harvesters can 
buy any amount of harvest quota at this price, so he has to pay for its quota in proportion to its 
harvest. Assuming a liner marginal cost of effort curve, a downward sloping demand curve for 
harvest quota can be derived (Flaaten, 2016).  
As presented in section 5.3, fuel costs accounted for larger proportions of the vessels 
total operating costs. The annual government support on fuel subsidy represent about 0.8% of 
total operating costs. This percentage may look insignificant. However, it represents about 2% 
of the mean net revenue of a fishing vessel. In fact, fisheries subsidies that encourage expansion 
of effort are disregarded and not recommended in most cases, because one of the aims of 
fisheries management at a global scale is to reduce fishing capacity and effort (FAO, 2012).   
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION  
 
 
In general, both fishing fleets had fairly good economic performance results, since most 
vessels gross revenue exceeded the real cost of the factors of production, the resultant positive 
EBITDA implies that, vessel owners would be commercially viable in the short term, but not 
operating optimally upon a long-term analysis. EPI, with the exception of OM and ROC were 
relatively higher in Namibe than Benguela fleet. This was due to differences in invested capital, 
CPUE, cost per unit effort and market price of fish. However, there was no statistically 
significant difference in the mean values of EPI. In general, we could say that low cost fishing 
operations, as the case of Namibe fleet, had the greatest potential for generating resource rent. 
However, lower price per unit of catch within the Namibe market, have caused lower profits. 
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On the other hand, highly cost-fishing operations, as the case of Benguela fleet, may even make 
it uneconomical to sustain the fishery on a commercial basis. However, relatively higher prices 
per unit of harvest within the Benguela market, has allowed operators to sustain in the short 
run. Hence, vessels in Namibe were more efficient in terms of cost than those in Benguela 
(statistically significant different). This was mainly explained by lower labour costs and lower 
fuel consumption per unit of fish landed. Supported by the fact that Namibe has a relatively 
cheaper labour market; and vessels have easier access to fish fishing grounds than those in 
Benguela. In fact, better fuel efficiency reflects better eco-efficiency, thus vessels in Namibe, 
in particular large engine ones operated with the best environmental efficiency.  
Within the Benguela fleet, vessels group 400<HP≤700 had the best economic 
performance while, in Namibe were those with HP>700. Such differences were explained by 
variations in vessels fishing power, efficiency and investment on capital. In terms of cost 
efficiency, a contrary situation was observed, vessels with HP>700 in Benguela and those with 
400<HP≤700 in Namibe fleets operated with the lowest cost per unit of effort. This was 
explained by lower fuel consumption per ton of fish landed in Namibe. However, when 
considering cost efficiency in terms of cost revenue ratio, 400<HP≤700 in Benguela, and 
HP>700 in Namibe performed relatively well; had the least operating costs in terms of cents 
spent to generate a dollar of revenue. Overall, smaller engine vessels (100<HP≤400), operated 
with relatively poor cost efficiency. This was explained by technological creep and capital 
versus labor-intensive methods. Thus, vessel 400<HP≤700 in Benguela and those HP>700 in 
Namibe had the best performance results in terms of productivity and economic efficiency.  
The economic measure aimed to regulate fishing effort, at the same time generate 
revenue to the state namely, harvest tax has increased the industry operating costs, but in very 
small proportions when comparing to other costs such as fuel and labor costs. On the other 
hand, fuel cost support by the state, has lowered the industry costs to about 1%, representing 
about 3% of the industry net revenue.  
The results presented may have some implications for management of the coastal purse 
seiners in Benguela and Namibe fishing towns, and could be used by the Angolan Fisheries 
Management Authorities as a basis to restructure the Small Pelagic Fishery particularly 
following the Small Pelagic FMP and the National Development Plan 2013-2017.  
Fishing for resources such as shrimp and tuna, which command a high market price, 
encourages high fuel consumption (FAO, 2012). However, fishing for resources such as 
sardinellas and herring, which fetch low prices on the market, incurs low fuel consumption 
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Appendix A: Characteristics of the fishing vessels 
 
Table 1A: Characteristics of the sampled fishing vessels in Benguela fishing towns 
Vessel	  ID	   LOA	   HP	   TAB	   Crew	   Fuel	  (1000	  
L/year)	  
1	   18	   220	   60	   17	   320	  
2	   22,90	   360	   56	   17	   320	  
3	   14.3	   190	   25	   16	   300	  
4	   21,75	   335	   120	   15	   300	  
5	   15	   235	   30	   12	   300	  
6	   19	   450	   53	   18	   300	  
7	   25,8	   406	   139	   30	   360	  
8	   24,7	   425	   43.3	   15	   144	  
9	   23	   425	   60	   30	   360	  
10	   19	   450	   57	   15	   120	  
11	   30	   850	   354	   13	   120	  
12	   43,1	   1000	   349	   12	   120	  
13	   24,99	   1000	   191	   10	   720	  
14	   37	   1690	   364	   17	   120	  
 
Table 2A: Characteristics of the sampled fishing vessels in Namibe fishing town 
Vessel	  ID	   LOA	   HP	   TAB	   Crew	   Fuel	  (1000	  
L/year)	  	  
1	   20	   250	   40	   18	   156	  
2	   20	   360	   45	   25	   156	  
3	   30	   400	   54	   18	   156	  
4	   17	   380	   48	   15	   140	  
5	   19	   450	   69	   22	   240	  
6	   19	   450	   53	   22	   360	  
7	   19	   450	   56	   27	   360	  
8	   19	   450	   53	   22	   320	  
9	   19	   450	   69	   16	   360	  
10	   43	   850	   431	   15	   80	  
11	   37	   1100	   250	   15	   120	  
12	   30.5	   1000	   108	   15	   120	  
13	   37	   1200	   300	   15	   80	  
14	   38	   1200	   380	   15	   120	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Appendix B: Input and output of fishing vessels 
 






























1	   1.000.000	   30834	   711.410	   23.07	   1136	   795.200	   0.037	   25.79	  
2	   700.000	   29375	   435.538	   14.83	   1000	   700.000	   0.034	   23.83	  
3	   1.250.000	   32280	   741.665	   22.98	   1614	   1.129.800	   0.050	   35.00	  
4	   1.200.000	   39096	   629.485	   16.10	   1086	   760.200	   0.028	   19.44	  
5	   1.500.000	   29068	   386.548	   13.30	   1128	   789.600	   0.039	   27.16	  
6	   1.875.000	   57857	   711.495	   12.30	   1800	   1.260.000	   0.031	   21.78	  
7	   2.000.000	   33847	   862.403	   25.48	   2501	   1.750.700	   0.074	   51.72	  
8	   1.600.000	   31875	   758.008	   23.78	   1500	   1.050.000	   0.047	   32.94	  
9	   1.200.000	   47430	   453.853	   9.57	   1054	   737.800	   0.022	   15.56	  
10	   1.500.000	   35471	   395.486	   11.15	   1085	   759.500	   0.031	   21.41	  
11	   2.000.000	   63826	   807.444	   12.65	   1468	   1.027.600	   0.023	   16.10	  
12	   2.000.000	   42692	   544.851	   12.76	   1557	   1.089.900	   0.036	   25.53	  
13	   1.800.000	   45200	   804.794	   17.81	   1130	   791.000	   0.025	   17.50	  
14	   2.500.000	   85254	   1.335.716	   15.67	   3279	   2.295.300	   0.038	   26.92	  
 




























1	   1.875.000	   73800	   416.587	   5.64	   1312	   695.360	   0.018	   9.42	  
2	   1.875.000	   67150	   426.269	   6.35	   1343	   711.790	   0.020	   10.60	  
3	   1.875.000	   96075	   458.781	   4.78	   2135	   1.131.550	   0.022	   11.78	  
4	   1.000.000	   42234	   344.950	   8.17	   778	   412.340	   0.018	   9.76	  
5	   1.800.000	   59500	   743.551	   12.50	   1785	   946.050	   0.030	   15.90	  
6	   3.500.000	   118320	   1.494.774	   12.63	   6902	   2.760.800	   0.058	   23.33	  
7	   3.500.000	   116200	   1.082.394	   9.31	   5810	   2.324.000	   0.050	   20.00	  
8	   3.500.000	   105514	   1.277.523	   12.11	   8633	   3.021.550	   0.082	   28.64	  
9	   3.200.000	   74743	   1.073.844	   14.37	   5276	   1.846.600	   0.071	   24.71	  
10	   1.400.000	   68775	   221.558	   3.22	   917	   486.010	   0.013	   7.07	  
11	   1.800.000	   53378	   341.830	   6.40	   1201	   636.530	   0.023	   11.93	  
12	   600.000	   41325	   252.812	   6.12	   551	   292.030	   0.013	   7.07	  
13	   700.000	   45540	   216.725	   4.76	   759	   402.270	   0.017	   8.83	  




Appendix C: Statistical test results 
 
 
Table 1C: T test results of mean operating cash 
flow margin 
 Table 2C: T test results of mean operating margin 
 t-­Test:  Two-­Sample  Assuming  Equal  Variances  
     
     Benguela   Namibe  
Mean   0.3364   0.3949  
Variance   0.0270   0.0222  
Observations   14.0000   14.0000  
Pooled  Variance   0.0246     
Hypothesized  Mean  
Difference   0.0000     
df   26.0000     
t  Stat   -­0.9874     
P(T<=t)  one-­tail   0.1663     
t  Critical  one-­tail   1.7056     
P(T<=t)  two-­tail   0.3325     
t  Critical  two-­tail   2.0555       
 
 t-­Test:  Two-­Sample  Assuming  Equal  Variances  
     
     Benguela   Namibe  
Mean   0.142208292   0.136481634  
Variance   0.033547523   0.0355933  
Observations   14   14  
Pooled  Variance   0.034529504     
Hypothesized  Mean  
Difference   0     
df   25     
t  Stat   0.080012875     
P(T<=t)  one-­tail   0.468432043     
t  Critical  one-­tail   1.7081407     
P(T<=t)  two-­tail   0.9368640     
t  Critical  two-­tail   2.059538553       
 
      
Table 3C: T test results of mean EBT 
 
 Table 4C: T test results of mean ROC 
 t-­Test:  Two-­Sample  Assuming  Unequal  Variances  
     Benguela   Namibe  
Mean   185900.9214   267466.9143  
Variance  
6087940603
4   1.56366E+11  
Observations   14   14  
Hypothesized  Mean  
Difference   0     
df   22     
t  Stat   0.654783135     
P(T<=t)  one-­tail   0.259697637     
t  Critical  one-­tail   1.717144374     
P(T<=t)  two-­tail   0.519395274     
t  Critical  two-­tail   2.073873068       
 
 t-­Test:  Two-­Sample  Assuming  Equal  Variances  
     
     Benguela   Namibe  
Mean   0.104446419   0.086462451  
Variance   0.014617467   0.013243424  
Observations   14   14  
Pooled  Variance   0.013930446     
Hypothesized  Mean  
Difference   0     
df   26     
t  Stat   0.40313643     
P(T<=t)  one-­tail   0.345071938     
t  Critical  one-­tail   1.70561792     
P(T<=t)  two-­tail   0.690143875     
t  Critical  two-­tail   2.055529439       
 









Table 5C: T test results of mean Cost per unit 
effort 
 Table 6C: T test results of mean revenue per unit 
effort 
 
t-­Test:  Two-­Sample  Assuming  Equal  Variances  
     
     Benguela   Namibe  
Mean   16.53112975   8.288067836  
Variance   27.49847276   13.21642862  
Observations   14                                 14  
Pooled  Variance   20.35745069     
Hypothesized  Mean  
Difference   0     
df   26     
t  Stat   4.833657635     
P(T<=t)  one-­tail   2.60657E-­05     
t  Critical  one-­tail   1.70561792     
P(T<=t)  two-­tail   0.0000521     
t  Critical  two-­tail   2.055529439       
 
 t-­Test:  Two-­Sample  Assuming  Equal  Variances  
     
     Benguela   Namibe  
Mean   25.76362754   14.25931456  
Variance   89.11636692   49.90201505  
Observations   14   14  
Pooled  Variance   69.50919099     
Hypothesized  
Mean  Difference   0     
df   26     
t  Stat   3.65080462     
P(T<=t)  one-­tail   0.000577085     
t  Critical  one-­tail   1.70561792     
P(T<=t)  two-­tail   0.001154169     
t  Critical  two-­tail   2.055529439       
 
      
 
Table 7C: T test results of mean CPUE 
  
  
Table 8C: T test results of mean fuel efficiency 
  
t-­Test:  Two-­Sample  Assuming  Equal  Variances  
     
     Benguela   Namibe  
Mean   0.036805182   0.032499581  
Variance   0.00018187   0.000521644  
Observations   14   14  
Pooled  Variance   0.000351757     
Hypothesized  Mean  
Difference   0     
df   26     
t  Stat   0.607381399     
P(T<=t)  one-­tail   0.274433144     
t  Critical  one-­tail   1.70561792     
P(T<=t)  two-­tail   0.548866287     
t  Critical  two-­tail   2.055529439       
  
 t-­Test:  Two-­Sample  Assuming  Equal  Variances  
     
     Benguela   Namibe  
Mean   183.5321562   109.7794927  
Variance   5516.92558   2885.706739  
Observations   14   14  
Pooled  Variance   4201.316159     
Hypothesized  Mean  
Difference   0     
df   26     
t  Stat   3.010468218     
P(T<=t)  one-­tail   0.002868838     
t  Critical  one-­tail   1.70561792     
P(T<=t)  two-­tail   0.005737677     
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Table 9C: T test results of mean Labour costs 
 
Table 10C: T test results of mean running costs 
 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Equal	  Variances	  
	     
	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   170801.9643	   106156	  
Variance	   4003555109	   4994056662	  
Observations	   14	   14	  
Pooled	  Variance	   4498805886	   	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  
Difference	   0	   	  
df	   26	   	  
t	  Stat	   2.550018306	   	  
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0.008504904	   	  
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1.70561792	   	  
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0.017009809	   	  
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   2.055529	   	  	  
 
 t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Equal	  Variances	  
	     
	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   322489.8286	   311695.2286	  
Variance	   26995446217	   59144101086	  
Observations	   14	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  
Pooled	  Variance	   43069773651	   	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  
Difference	   0	   	  
df	   26	   	  
t	  Stat	   0.137616111	   	  
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0.445802017	   	  
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1.70561792	   	  
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0.891604034	   	  
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   2.055529439	   	  	  
 
	    	  
Table 11C: T test results of mean vessels costs  Table 12C: T test results of mean capital costs 
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	     
	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   166329.2143	   144487.5	  
Variance	   1851426079	   7693154849	  
Observations	   14	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  
Hypothesized	  Mean	  
Difference	   0	   	  
df	   19	   	  
t	  Stat	   0.836512254	   	  
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0.206632206	   	  
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1.729132812	   	  
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0.413264412	   	  
t	  Critical	  two-­‐tail	   2.093024054	   	  	  
 
 	     
t-­‐Test:	  Two-­‐Sample	  Assuming	  Unequal	  Variances	  
	     
	  	   Variable	  1	   Variable	  2	  
Mean	   196806.6429	   	  247918.0714	  
Variance	   3254825333	   19444182545	  
Observations	   14	   	  	  	  	  	  14	  
Hypothesized	  
Mean	  Difference	   0	   	  
df	   17	   	  
t	  Stat	   -­‐1.269341852	   	  
P(T<=t)	  one-­‐tail	   0.11071115	   	  
t	  Critical	  one-­‐tail	   1.739606726	   	  
P(T<=t)	  two-­‐tail	   0.2214223	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5.   Mending seine-Namibe  6.   Landing terminal-Namibe 
 
 




 8.   Landing terminal-Namibe 
Source: Authors images. 
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